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INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY 
Over the past 10 years, Europe has witnessed two enormous financial crises: the Great Reces-
sion and the Sovereign Debt crisis. During this time, most European countries faced ever-
worsening financial states, and it is only thanks to European Central Bank’s (ECB) interven-
tion that some countries were saved from total financial collapse. The adoption of Quantita-
tive Easing policy has produced some small but positive effects within the euro area. Howev-
er, it is unclear whether these policies are still necessary, and if they are not, why the ECB has 
continued to renew such a large purchasing programme? If they are necessary, why have tar-
get levels of inflation not yet been met across Europe? 
These are the questions that triggered our desire to explore the ways in which the ECB con-
ducts its monetary policy, as well as the instruments used by the United States Federal Re-
serve Bank and the rest of the world’s central banks during the same period. We also hope to 
determine whether it would have been possible for the ECB to have performed better during 
these financial crises.  
CHAPTER 1 will detail the standard monetary policies of  the ECB, then identify the main tar-
get of the ECB. We will conclude this first section with a description of the sets of tools 
available to the ECB and its American counterpart. 
In CHAPTER 2, we will describe the Sovereign Debt crisis and the ECB’s reaction to it, illus-
trating in detail the different phases of the European Quantitative Easing programme and its 
main transmission channels. 
Following this, CHAPTER 3 tries to examine the effectiveness of the Unconventional Monetary 
Policy from both a macroeconomic and microeconomic perspective. We will illustrate the re-
sults of the shock caused by the Unconventional Monetary Policy and how the heterogeneity 
among European countries resulted in different effects in terms of price and output. Finally, 
we will try to analyse the main causes of the still-low inflation levels by examining the money 
multipliers of the various European countries and the factors at the base of their reduction. 
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In conclusion, we will suggest some policies that could be implemented in response to the 
heterogeneity of the euro zone countries. These policies would aim to minimise the difference 
between the real and potential values of some variables, such as gross domestic product and 
unemployment levels. Moreover, we will also propose some reforms that would increase the 
soundness of the banking system across member states.  
To draw on the now-famous 2012 speech by the former ECB governor Mario Draghi that “the 




THE ORDINARY MONETARY POLICY 
This chapter will focus on the ordinary monetary policy that the European Central Bank 
(ECB) usually conducts under the conventional monetary regime. Once the main target of the 
ECB (1.1) is defined, the principal instruments through which the ECB conducts its monetary 
policy will be explained in the second section (1.2). The first section presents a comparison of 
the ECB and the Federal Reserve’s objectives; in fact, frequently, its counterpart, the central 
bank of the United States (US)  (the Federal Reserve System [FED]) is taken as a benchmark 
or guide for the implementation of the European monetary policy. Thus, a description of the 
FED’s monetary policy instruments will also be provided (1.3). 
Moreover, the chapter presents the ordinary monetary policy conducted by every central bank 
under a conventional monetary regime, the variables that  a central bank considers when im-
plementing the policy, and, from an analytical and graphical point of view, the equilibrium 
condition between the demand for central bank money and the supply of that money (1.4). Fi-
nally, the last section (1.5) presents a discussion of the Taylor Rule that can be viewed as an 
operational procedure that represents the fluctuations of the FED’s interest rate and the ECB’s 
interest rate over the last 15–20 years. 
 
1.1 Targets of ECB and FED 
 
In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the main institution responsible for defining 
and implementing monetary policy. ECB, together with the banks that actually adopt the euro 
as currency, the so-called National Central Banks (NCBs), constitute the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). ECB’s role is important because it coordinates the operations that 
each NCB can execute; thus, for example, the ECB coordinates the transaction regarding the 
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supply of funds to banks, or it holds and manages the foreign exchange reserve of the differ-
ent European member states (Micossi, 2015). 
There is an important difference between the implementation of a monetary policy and the 
implementation of a fiscal policy; in fact, if the fiscal policy is established at the country lev-
el, the monetary policy is much more centralised. Consequently, every European member 
state is responsible for the definition and implementation of its fiscal policy. For example, a 
country can adopt a contractionary fiscal policy, such as the reduction in the amount of the 
Value Added Tax (VAT), in order to stimulate consumption and investments, but it cannot 
implement any kind of monetary policies. This is the result of the unification process started 
in 1992 with the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty that ended with the introduction of the euro 
in 2001. From that moment on, the monetary policy was no longer under the control of each 
single state.  
The ECB’s guidelines and decisions are conducted on the basis of specific targets. In particu-
lar, the ECB establishes the main benchmarks that it would like to reach, and, in accordance 
with these, it defines the correct policies that have to be transmitted to the NCBs. 
The main target of ECB is defined in chapter 2 of the TFEU, article 127(1), ex article 105(1): 
 
Article 127 
(Ex Article 105 TEC) 
1. The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. 
The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competi-
tion, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Ar-
ticle 119. 
 
As explained by the article, maintaining price stability is the main target of the ECB. Only 
when this benchmark is reached does the ECB support the European policies that incentivise 
balanced and sustainable growth. Accordingly, the target level of prices established by the 
ECB is below, but close, to 2%. 
As previously mentioned, the central bank of the US, the FED, is often taken as a benchmark 
when the European monetary policy is defined and implemented, so its policy is relevant. To 
better understand the FED’s monetary policy, it is important to consider how its targets differ 




The section 225a in Title 12: “Banks and Banking”, in Chapter 3: “Federal Reserve System” 
of the United States Code (U.S.C), edition 2006, states that: 
 
TITLE 12—BANKS AND BANKING 
225a. Maintenance of long run growth of monetary and credit aggregates. The Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth 
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to in-
crease production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates. 
  
While maintaining price stability is the main target of the ECB, the FED presents a “Dual 
Mandate” and pursues two main objectives: price stability, like its European counterpart, and, 
equally important, full employment. While the latter target does not mean a level of unem-
ployment rate equal to 0%, it does imply a level of unemployment rate as close as possible to 
the level of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). In conjunction 
with these two objectives, the FED pursues other two economic outcomes: the increase in  
production and moderation of long-term interest rates.    
As previously explained, in some ways, the European monetary policy is influenced by the 
decisions of its US counterpart, and when comparing the monetary policy of the ECB and the 
FED, is it important to consider that different targets determine different policies. The differ-
ent targets between the central banks is one of the reasons for the unequal effects of the so-
called extraordinary monetary policies that will be explained in the subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
 
1.2 Conventional Instruments of the European monetary policy 
This section explains the monetary policy instruments used by the ECB during conventional 
periods. A distinction must be made between the so-called conventional and unconventional 
periods. The first is a period characterised by stable economic conditions, while the second re-
fers to periods affected by some financial distress, such as a global crisis, economic recessions 
or any kind of event that prevents the use of the traditional instruments in the implementation 
of the monetary policy.  
Implementation of the European monetary policy rests on two pillars (Micossi, 2015). The 
first pillar is the monetary policy strategy; it defines the appropriate interest rate needed to 
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achieve price stability. The second pillar is the operational framework; it consists of the set of 
tools and procedures that are used to achieve the desired interest rate.  
Thus, when establishing and implementing its conventional monetary policy, the ECB uses 
the following instruments (European Central Bank, 2006): 
 
! Open Market Operations (OMOs); 
! Standing Facilities; 
! Minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions. 
 
The OMOs consists of : 
 
• Main Refinancing Operations (MROs): these reverse transactions regularly provide 
liquidity to the different NCBs. They are usually conducted in a decentralized way, 
way, every week, on the basis of standard tenders, according to a European calendar; 
• Longer-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs): these are always reverse transac-
tions that provide liquidity to the NCBs; however, with respect to MROs, they have a 
longer maturity, usually equal to three months. Like MROs, they are conducted on the 
basis of standard tenders; 
• Fine Tuning Operations: these are ad hoc measures that provide liquidity to the cen-
tral banks in a situation of shortage; in particular, they want to smooth the movement 
of the interest rate caused by unexpected liquidity fluctuations. Normally, they are 
conducted by the ECB on the basis of quick tenders or through bilateral procedures; 
• Structural Operations: these are usually conducted through the issue of debt certifi-
cates, by reverse or outright transactions. They are conducted every time the ECB 
wants to regulate its structural position given the European financial situation.    
 
The second tool available to the ECB is the Standing Facilities. Different from the MROs, 
these are procedures that provide and absorb liquidity overnight, so they are managed by the 
NCBs, and they are conducted on a daily basis. The Standing Facilities consist of the mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility. Different commercial banks can use the mar-
ginal lending facility to obtain liquidity overnight from the NCB to satisfy any possible daily 
shortages. With the deposit facility, the different commercial banks can deposit the excess 
overnight liquidity into the NCB.   
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Usually, the interest rates applied to these two instruments are used to determine the corridor 
through which the overnight market interest rate moves. For example, the interest rate on the 
marginal lending facilities is used as the ceiling of the corridor; since 18 September 2019, it is 
equal to 0.25%. The deposit facility rate is used as the floor; since18 September 2019, it is 
equal to -0.50% (ECB website). The overnight market interest rate moves through these two 
values, and it represents the average interest rate at which banks lend funds in the euro’s in-
terbank money market. 
In most cases, the overnight market interest rate is generally defined as the “interest rate”, and 
it is the main instrument taken into consideration at when defining and implementing a mone-
tary policy.  Accordingly, each central bank uses a different term for this interest rate: 
 
• The ECB uses Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA); 
• The FED uses Federal Funds Rate (US Federal Reserve overnight rate); 
• The Bank of England (BOE) uses Sterling OverNight Index Average (SONIA); 
• The Bank of Japan (BOJ) uses Japanese Uncollateralised Overnight Call Rate 
(MUTAN). 
 
Figure 1: Key ECB interest rates and the EONIA since 1999 (Percentages per annum; daily data). 
 
Source: European Central Bank (2011). 
 
Figure 1 depicts the marginal lending facility rate (the ceiling) and the deposit facility rate 
(the floor) that constitute the corridor. As seen, the EONIA interest rate and the interest rate of 
MROs, which is as important as the EONIA, move through this corridor. The graph repre-
sents the interest rate fluctuations from 1999 to 2010. As seen, beginning in 2008 there was a 
strong decrease in the interest rate due to the US financial  crisis.  
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By setting the rates on the standing 
facilities, the Governing Council 
effectively determines the corridor 
within which the overnight  money 
market rate can fluctuate. Chart 4.2 
shows the development of key ECB 
interest rates since January 1999 and 
how the interest rates on the standing 
facilities have provided a ceiling and a 
floor for the overnight market interest 
rate, measured by the euro overnight 
index average (EONIA). 
Chart 4.2 shows that, in normal times, 
the EONIA has generally remained 
close to the rate on the MROs, thus 
demonstrating the importance of these 
operations as the main monetary policy 
instrument of the Eurosystem. This 
behaviour changed in October 2008, 
when the Eurosystem adopted  non-
standard measures to counter the 
negative effects of the i tensification 
of the financial crisis (see Box 5.1 and 
Chapter 5). Chart 4.2 also shows that 
the EONIA exhibits a pattern of 
occasional spikes. This pattern is 
related to the Eurosystem’s minimum 
reserve system, as explained further 
in Section 4.3. 
Finally, Chart 4.2 shows that the 
differences between the standing 
facility interest rates and the rate 
on the MROs were kept unchanged 
between April 1999 and October 2008 
at ±1 percentage point. The width 
of the corridor was then temporarily 
narrowed to ±0.5 percentage point, 
before being widened again to 
±0.75 percentage point in May 2009, 
when the Governing Council 










Chart 4.2 Key ECB interest rates and the EONIA since 1999

















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
marginal lending rate 
deposit rate 
EONIA 
main refinancing/minimum bid rate 
Source: ECB.
1) Before 28 June 2000 MROs were conducted as fixed rate tenders. Starting with the operation settled on 
28 June 2000, and until the operation settled on 15 October 2008, MROs were conducted as variable rate tenders 
with a pre-announced minimum bid rate. Since the operation settled on 15 October 2008, MROs have been 
conducted as fixed rate tenders with full allotment. This procedure is scheduled to remain in place at least until the 
maintenance period ending on 12 July 2011. The minimum bid rate refers to the minimum interest rate at which 
counterparties may place their bids (see Section 4.4).
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Regarding the interest rate, is important to introduce the assumption that, in reality, the ECB 
controls and handles the real, and thus, the inflation-adjusted, short-term interest rate, not the 
nominal one. This is because the real interest rate considers variations in the inflation expecta-
tions. Moreover, the real short-term interest rate changes the level of the asset prices and in-
fluences the decisions made by consumers, investors and banks, which also effects the overall 
level of economic output.  
 
The minimum reserve requirement for credit institutions is the last instrument that the 
ECB can use to conduct its monetary policy under the conventional regime. This refers to the 
percentage of deposits and debt securities, with a maturity up to two years, that each credit in-
stitution must hold in its current account. In the euro system, this has changed over time. Until 
2012, this percentage was equal to 2%; since then, it has been reduced to 1% (ECB website). 
This reserve requirement is used to maintain the stability of the money market interest rate 
and create or increase a structural liquidity shortage; this deficit is covered by implementing 
the MROs and the LTROs. 
 
1.3 Conventional Instruments of the FED monetary policy 
 
This section presents a description of the conventional monetary policy’s instruments used by 
the FED in order to reach its main targets. It can be noted that the set of tools available for the 
ECB and the FED are almost identical, even though they have different policy targets. The 
main  instruments used by the FED are (Federal Reserve, 2018): 
 
" Open Market Operations OMOs; 
" Discount Rate; 
" Reserve Requirements; 
" Term Deposit Facility (TDF). 
 
The most important tool available to the FED is the OMO. OMOs are the purchases and sales 
of securities in the open market conducted by the US central bank; thus, any OMO changes 
the volume of the FED’s balance sheet. There are two types of OMOs: permanent OMOs and 
temporary OMOs.  
In permanent OMOs, the central bank outright purchases or sells the securities for the Federal 
Reserve’s portfolio, defined as the System Open Market Account (SOMA). These operations 
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are usually used to fulfil the long-run factors that drive the expansion of the FED’s balance 
sheet. 
Permanent OMOs must be distinguished from temporary OMOs. The latter are all the opera-
tions conducted by the FED in order to satisfy any reserve needs that are considered to be 
transitory. A repo (repurchase) agreement and a reverse repo agreement are two examples of 
temporary OMOs. Under a repo agreement, the FED buys a security with the agreement of re-
selling it in the future. In the case of a reverse repo agreement, the FED sells a security with 
the agreement of repurchasing the same one in the future. 
 
The second instrument used by the FED is the Discount Rate. This is the rate charged on 
loans that commercial banks and other depository institutions receive from their regional Fed-
eral Reserve Bank’s lending facility. The FED offers three discount rate windows: primary 
credit, secondary credit and seasonal credit. 
For the primary credit option, loans are extended for a very short period of time, usually over-
night, to depository institutions that have good and stable financial conditions. The depository 
institutions excluded from the primary credit option can ask for the secondary credit option in 
order to satisfy any kind of liquidity shortages and eventual financial distress. In general, the 
interest rate is higher under the secondary credit option than the primary credit option, and the 
latter is higher, in turn, than the short-term market interest rate. The third option is seasonal 
credit, which is directed at the small depository institutions that have frequent fluctuations in 
seasonal funds, such as the depository institutions of agricultural communities, in which li-
quidity fluctuates in accordance with the natural cycle of the agricultural industry. 
 
Another instrument used by FED to conduct its monetary policy is the Reserve Require-
ments. This is the amount of funds that a depository institution must hold in reserve against 
specified deposit liabilities. Different depository institutions must hold reserves in the form of 
cash or deposits at the FED. Different percentages of the reserve are required, depending on 
the amount of liabilities the bank has. It is possible to distinguish three main ratios: 0%, 3% 









Table 1: Minimum Federal Reserve Requirements. 
Net transactions accounts % of liabilities required 
$0 to $16.3 million 0% 
More than $16.3 million to $124.2 million 3% 
More than $124.2 million 10% 
Source: FED website. 
 
The fourth main instrument that facilitates the implementation of the FED’s monetary policy 
is the Term Deposit Facility (TDF). The FED uses this instrument to manage the amount of 
reserve balances held by depository institutions. Every depository institution that participates 
in this system will benefit because the funds placed in the term deposit will be removed from 
its reserve account for the entire period of the term deposit. In this situation, reserve banks 
provide a TDF; thus, each participating depositary institution will receive earnings on the de-
posits placed at the reserve bank’s TDF.  
 
1.4 The equilibrium in the money market 
 
This section explains the general monetary policy conducted by every central bank once it has 
identified its main targets. First, the equilibrium condition in the financial markets is defined, 
under the assumption that the money supply is directly control by the central bank. Then, the 
real economic assumption of commercial banks as suppliers of money is discussed. This de-
velopment will be added to the previous model; moreover, its difference, with respect to the 
previous easier case, will be analytically explained.  
 
To better understand how the central banks effectively work, it is first necessary to explain the 
fundamental equilibrium condition in the financial market; this is the same for every single 
central bank, and it is pursued by the ECB, the FED, the BOE and the BOJ. This fundamental 
condition states that the money demand must be equal to the money supply (Blanchard et al.,  
2012).  
 
The money demand is the relation that explains the amount of money that people would like 
to hold, taking into consideration the trade-off between the currency and deposit account. This 
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trade-off is based on two factors: the transactions’ frequency and the interest yield. It is obvi-
ous that, if the frequency of the transaction is very high, an individual will prefer to maintain 
a larger amount of currency with respect to his/her deposit accounts; however, this will pre-
vent him/her from receiving a larger amount of interest from the deposit account. Therefore, 
every individual presents a particular mix of currency and deposits, and this combination de-
pends on the interest rate and the frequency of the transactions. In turn, the latter factor de-
pends on the individual’s nominal wage; in fact, a higher nominal income is usually associat-
ed with a higher frequency and a larger number of transactions.  
 
Money demand can be explained by the following equation: 
𝑀! = €𝑌𝐿 𝑖  
where 𝑀𝑑 is the money demand, €𝑌 is the nominal wage and 𝐿 𝑖  is a function of the interest 
rate. The interest rate has a negative effect on the money demand. In fact, the higher the inter-
est rate, the higher the individual’s preference for a deposit account; this results in a lower 
demand for money. Instead, in the case of a nominal wage increase, the money demand in-
creases because the individual will request a higher amount of currency since it is assumed 
that the frequency of the transaction will increase with a larger amount of income.  
 
As seen in Figure 2, the money demand curve has a negative slope because of the trade-off in 
the individual preferences. A higher interest rate will determine a lower amount of money. 
Moreover, it is possible to see the shift in the curve. Increasing the nominal wage to the level 
€𝑌′ will cause movement to the right of the curve. Thus, at the same level of interest rate, the 
increase in the nominal income will determine the increase in the money demand.  
 
Figure 2: Money demand curve. 
 
Source: Blanchard et al. (2010). 
the sum of all the individual demands for money by the people in the economy. Therefore,
it depends on the overall level of transactions in the economy and on the interest rate. The
overall level of transactions in the economy is hard to measure, but it is likely to be roughly
proportional to nominal income (income measured in euros). If nominal income were to
increase by 10%, it is reasonable to think that the value of transactions in the economy
would also increase by roughly 10%. We can write the relation between the demand for
money, nominal income and the inter st rate as
Md = aYL(i) [4.1]
(−)
where aY denotes nominal income. Read this equation in the following way: the demand 
for money, Md, is equal to nominal income, aY, times a function of the interest rate, i, with
the function denoted by L(i). The minus sign under i in L(i) captures the fact that the inter-
est rate has a negative effect on money demand: an increase in the interest rate decreases the
demand for money, as people put more of their wealth into bo ds.
Equation (4.1) summarises what we have discussed so far:
● First, the demand for money increases in proportion to nominal income. If nominal
income doubles, increasing from aY to a2 Y, then the demand for money also doubles,
increasing from aYL(i) to 2 aYL(i).
● Second, the demand for money depends negatively on the interest rate. This is captured
by the function L(i) and the negative sign underneath: an increase in the interest rate
decreases the demand for money.
The relation between the demand for money, nominal income and the interest rate
implied by equation (4.1) is shown in Figure 4.1. The interest rate, i, is measured on the 
vertical axis. Money, M, is measured on the horizontal axis.
The relation between the demand for money and the interest rate for a given level of 
nominal income, a Y, is represented by the Md curve. The curve is downward sloping: the
lower the interest rate (the lower i), the higher the amount of money people want to hold
(the higher M).
For a given interest rate, an increase in nominal income increases the demand for money.
In other words, an increase in nominal income shifts the demand for money to the right,
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Revisit Chapter 2’s example of an
economy composed of a steel company
and a car company. Calculate the total
value of transactions in that economy.
If the steel and the car companies 
doubled in size, what would happen to
transactions and to GDP?
➤
What matters here is nominal income –
income in euros, not real income. If real
income does not change but prices
double, leading to a doubling of nom-
inal income, people will need to hold




The demand for money
For a given level of nominal income, 
a lower interest rate increases the
demand for money. At a given interest
rate, an increase in nominal income





For money supply, the relation is different. If the money demand depends on the level of the 
interest rate, the money supply does not. Under the strong assumption that only the central 
bank supplies money, the equation is: 
𝑀! = 𝑀 
where 𝑀!  is the money supply and 𝑀 is the total amount of money issued by the central bank. 
From the money demand and money supply equations, it is possible to identify the equilibri-
um condition: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 =  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑀! = 𝑀! 
𝑀 = €𝑌𝐿(𝑖) 
Graphically, this equilibrium condition is represented by the intersection of the two curves 
(point A in both graphs). As seen in the Figure 3, the money supply is fixed because it is es-
tablished by the central bank; for this reason, it is vertical. The previous shift in the money 
demand curve as a result of the increase in nominal income €𝑌′ will determine the increase in 
the interest rate; this is because, at the initial level of the interest rate 𝑖, the new money de-
mand exceeds the previous money supply 𝑀! ′ > 𝑀! , and, in order to preserve the equilibri-
um condition, and thus discourage the money request, the interest rate must increase to the 
level 𝑖′. In contrast, the right side of the Figure 3 shows an increase in the money supply. In 
this case, at the initial level of interest rate 𝑖, the new money supply exceeds the previous 
money demand 𝑀!′ > 𝑀! , so the individual is much more willing to leave money in his/her 
deposit account. To preserve the equilibrium condition and encourage the demand of curren-
cy, the interest rate must decrease to the level 𝑖′. The initial stable situations are graphically 
represented by point 𝐴 in both graphs, while the new equilibrium situations are represented 
graphically by point 𝐴′. 
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Figure 3: Variations of the money demand and  the money supply curve. 
  
Source: Blanchard et al. (2010). 
 
The last case that discusses increasing the money supply to the new level 𝑀!′, perfectly repre-
sents the theoretical behaviour of each central bank. In fact, the ECB as well as the FED, the 
BOE and the BOJ, must first set the objective interest rate and then reduce or increase the 
money supply depending on the target. The reduction (or increase) of the money supply (𝑀!) 
will increase (or reduce) the level of the interest rate through the price mechanism. For exam-
ple, an increase in the money supply means an increase in the purchase of bonds, which will 
reduce the interest rate. The  higher the bond price, the lower the interest rate. However, this 
case represents a simple situation in which the money supply is exclusively determined by the 
central bank; in reality, this is not true.  
 
In the real world, the central bank must also consider the money supplied in the form of re-
serves issued by other financial institutions, such as commercial banks. Consequently, deter-
mining the interest rate, in this case, is much more complex. In particular, the interest rate is 
determined by the intersection of two curves: the supply of the central bank money with the 
demand for the central bank money. The supply of the central bank money is directly pro-
vided and managed by the central bank, while the demand for central bank money is more 
complex than the money demand previously discussed. In fact, the new demand is an exten-
sion of the previous one, and it consists of the total demand for currency and the demand for 
reserves by banks. 
 
● Figure 4.3 shows the effects of an increase in nominal income on the interest rate.
Figure 4.3 replicates Figure 4.2, and the initial equilibrium is at point A. An increase
in nominal income from aY to aY ′ increases the level of transactions, which increases the
demand for money at any interest rate. The money demand curve shifts to the right, from
Md to Md ′. The equilibrium moves from A up to A′, and the equilibrium interest rate
increases from i to i′.
In words: an increase in nominal income leads to an increase in the interest rate. The 
reason: at the initial interest rate, the demand for money exceeds the supply. An increase 
in the interest rate is needed to decrease the amount of money people want to hold and 
to re-establish equilibrium.
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Figure 4.2
The determination of the
interest rate
The interest rate must be such that the
supply of money (which is independent
of the interest rate) is equal to the
demand for money (which does 
depend on the interest rate).
Figure 4.3
The effects of an increase
in nominal income on the
interest rate
An increase in nominal income leads to
an increase in the interest rate.
● Figure 4.4 shows the effects of an increase in the money supply on the interest rate.
The initial equilibrium is at point A, with interest rate, i. An increase in the money 
supply, from M s = M to M s ′ = M ′, leads to a shift of the money supply curve to the right,
from M s to M s = M s ′. The equilibrium moves from A down to A′; the interest rate
decreases from i to i′.
In words: an increase in the supply of money by the central bank leads to a decrease in the
interest rate. The decrease in the interest rate increases the demand for money, so it
equals the now larger money supply.
Monetary policy and open market operations
We can get a better understanding of the results in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 by looking more closely
at how the central bank act ally changes the money supply and what happ ns when it does so.
Open market operations
In modern economies, the way that central banks change the supply of money is by buying
or selling bonds in the bond market. If a central bank wants to increase the amount of
money in the economy, it buys bonds and pays for them by creating money. If it wants to
decrease the amount of money in the economy, it sells bonds and removes from circulation
the money it receives in exchange for the bonds. These actions are called open market
operations because they take place in the ‘open market’ for bonds.
The balance sheet of the central bank is given in Figure 4.5a. The assets of the central
bank are the bonds it holds in its portfolio. Its liabilities are the stock of money in the econ-
omy. Open market operations (Figure 4.5b) lead to equal changes in assets and liabilities.
If the central bank buys, say, a1 million worth of bonds, the amount of bonds it holds is
higher by a1 million, and so is the amount of money in the economy. Such an operation is
called an expansionary open market operation because the central bank increases
(expands) the supply of oney.
If the central bank sells a1 million worth of bonds, both the amount of bonds held by the
central bank and the amount of money in the economy are lower by a1 mill on. Such an
operation is called a contractionary open market operation because the central bank
decrea es (contracts) the supply of money.
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Figure 4.4
The effects of an increase
in the money supply on the
interest rate
An increase in the supply of money
leads to a decrease in the interest rate.
The balance sheet of a bank (or a firm
or an individual) is a list of its assets
and liabilities at a point in time. The
assets are the sum of what the bank
owns and what is owed to it by others.





• As before, total demand for currency depends on the individual’s decision to hold depos-
its or money. It is already known that the demand for money depends, in turn, on the in-
terest rate and the frequency of the transactions; it is expressed by the equation: 
𝑀! = €𝑌𝐿(𝑖) 
Given the total amount of money demanded by the individual, he/she must decide on the 
amount of money he/she would like to hold as currency and the amount of money he/she 
would like to hold as deposits. Consequently, there will be an equation for the demand 
for currency: 𝐶𝑈! and an equation for the demand for deposits: 𝐷!. Assuming that every 
individual holds a fixed amount of currency (𝑐), the equations for these two demands 
would be: 
𝐶𝑈! = 𝑐𝑀! 
𝐷! = 1− 𝑐 𝑀! 
The first equation represents the first component of the demand for central bank money; 
in fact, it shows the public demand for the currency. 
 
• The demand for reserves by banks depends on the demand for deposits. Because banks 
must hold a certain amount of reserves in relation to the amount of deposits that they 
have, the demand for deposits generates the demand for reserves by banks. The higher the 
amount of the deposits that the banks hold, the higher the amount of reserves they also 
must hold. Banks hold reserves for safety reasons; in fact, it is possible that the daily in-
flows of cash are lower than the daily outflows of cash, so a bank holds a reserve in order 
to satisfy the possible shortage of cash. They also hold reserved due to legal obligations.  
 
Defining 𝜃 as the reserves ratio, R as the total amount of the reserve and  D as the total 
amount of deposits, it is possible to establish the following relation: 
𝑅 = 𝜃𝐷 
If individuals would like to hold the amount of deposits defined by 𝐷!, then the banks 
must hold 𝜃𝐷! reserves. Thus, the demand for reserves by banks is: 
𝑅! = 𝜃 1− 𝑐 𝑀! 
 
Given the equations for the public demand for currency and the demand for reserves by 
banks, it is possible to determine the demand for central bank money 𝐻! : 
𝐻! = 𝐶𝑈! + 𝑅! 
𝐻! = 𝑐𝑀! + 𝜃 1− 𝑐 𝑀! 
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𝐻! = 𝑐 + 𝜃(1− 𝑐) 𝑀! 
Substituting the 𝑀! with the equation found in the previous paragraph, the equation becomes: 
𝐻! = 𝑐 + 𝜃 1− 𝑐 €𝑌𝐿(𝑖) 
This equation represents the demand for central bank money. 
 
Since the supply of the central bank money (𝐻) is fixed and established by the central bank, 
the interest rate is determined by the equivalence of the two curves.  
𝐻 = 𝐻! 
𝐻 = 𝑐 + 𝜃 1− 𝑐 €𝑌𝐿(𝑖) 
Graphically, the equilibrium interest rate is identified by the intersection of the two curves, as 
seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Equilibrium in the market for central bank money and determination of the interest rate. 
 
Source: Blanchard et al. (2010). 
 
The amount of money supplied by the central bank is, by definition, equal to the reserves plus 
the currency. From an analytical point of view, the supply of the central bank money (𝐻) is 
equal to the demand for currency plus the reserve demand: 
𝐻 = 𝐶𝑈! + 𝑅! 
By moving the terms of the equation, it is possible to find that the reserve supply 𝐻 − 𝐶𝑈!  
is equal to the reserve demand 𝑅! : 
𝐻 − 𝐶𝑈! = 𝑅! 
𝑅! = 𝑅! 
(1) the demand for currency by people goes down; (2) the demand for deposit accounts by 
people also goes down. This leads to lower demand for reserves by banks. The supply of
money is fixed and is represented by a vertical line at H. Equilibrium is at point A, with 
interest rate, i.
The effects of either changes in nominal income or changes in the supply of central bank
money are qualitatively the same as in the previous section. In particular, an increase in the
supply of central bank money leads to a shift in the vertical supply line to the right. This
leads to a lower interest rate. As before, an increase in central bank money leads to a
decrease in the interest rate. Conversely, a decrease in central bank money leads to an
increase in the interest rate.
4.4 TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE
EQUILIBRIUM
In Section 4.3, we looked at the equilibrium through the condition that the supply and 
the demand of central bank money be equal. There are two other ways of looking at the
equilibrium. While they are all equivalent, each provides a different way of thinking about
the equilibrium, and going through each one will strengthen your understanding of how 
monetary policy affects the interest rate.
The interbank market and the overnight interest rate
Instead of thinking in terms of the supply and the demand for central bank money, we can
think in terms of the supply and the demand for bank reserves.
The supply of reserves is equal to the supply of central bank money, H, minus the demand
for currency by the public, CU d. The demand for reserves by banks is Rd. So the equilibrium
condition that the supply and the demand for bank reserves be equal is given by
H − CU d = Rd
Notice that if we move CU d from the left side to the right side and use the fact that 
the demand for central bank money, Hd, is given by Hd = CUd + Rd, then this equation is
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Figure 4.9
Equilibrium in the market
for central bank money 
and the determination of
the interest rate
The equilibrium interest rate is such
that the supply of central bank money
is equal to the demand for central bank
money.
Suppose people get worried about the
possibility of bank runs and decide to
hold a higher proportion of money in
the form of currency. If the central bank
keeps the money supply constant,
what will happen to the interest rate? ➤
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This means that it is possible to establish the correct interest rate, not only by using the de-
mand for central bank money and the supply of the central bank money, but also by using the 
demand and supply of the reserve. Therefore, each central bank can act in order to influence 
the reserve market and, in this way, achieve the desired interest rate. The behaviour of the 
ECB and the FED at the moment the interest rate of the reserve market is defined is somewhat 
different; the ECB defines the corridor over which the reserve interest rate (EONIA) has to 
move, while the FED conducts OMOs in order to achieve and maintain the reserve interest 
rate, as much as possible, near to the Federal Funds Target.  
 
1.5 Empirical evidence on inflation: the Taylor Rule  
 
This section discusses the Taylor Rule as a possible procedure that can help the central bank 
at the moment the interest rate is defined. According to the empirical estimations, this rule 
represents the trend and the fluctuations of the interest rate in Europe and the US. However, 
this does not mean that the ECB and the FED strictly implement the Taylor Rule; in fact, at 
the moment the interest rate is determined, these central banks also use other models and oth-
er variables to adopt the best interest rate.    
 
As previously mentioned, price stability is the main target pursued by the ECB, and, under the 
conventional monetary regime, it conducts OMOs in order to manage the interest rate and 
achieve the desired level of inflation.  It is obvious that the inflation rate is not under the con-
trol of the central banks. Thus, the Taylor Rule can help them determine the interest rate given 
the inflation rate target.  
 












Is difficult to establish which kind of rule the ECB should use to implement its monetary poli-
cy; it is certain that the interest rate should be managed by the main instrument available to a 
central bank in order to achieve its price stability target, but economists have proposed differ-
ent rules that each central bank could follow to conduct its monetary policy and achieve its 
monetary target. This will be illustrated using three different possible rules, each one sus-
tained by a different economic group (Mankiw & Taylor, 2011).  
 
The first rule, which is sustained by monetarists, supposes that the central bank should main-
tain a stable growth rate for the money supply. They think that fluctuation in the money sup-
ply is the main reason for variations in the economy, and they assert that a stable and slow in-
crease in the growth rate of the money supply should facilitate stability in the production and 
unemployment levels, resulting in steady  prices. The main criticism of this rule has been that 
the stable growth rate of the money supply only stabilises the economy if the liquidity in cir-
culation is always stable and does not fluctuate; as is already known, this is impossible since, 
in general, the economy is always affected by some shock, an example that was illustrated is 
the possible increase in the money demand.  
 
A second rule that is strongly sustained by the economists is that one should consider the 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP); this rule illustrates that the central bank should de-
termine a target for the nominal GDP, and it should follow the preannounced objective by in-
creasing or reducing the monetary growth. If the nominal GDP is lower than the nominal 
GDP’s target, then the central bank has to increase the monetary growth in order to increase 
the aggregate demand. With respect to the previous idea promoted by the monetarists, this 
rule has more support from other economists since the definition and the pursuit of the nomi-
nal GDP’s target permits a higher stabilisation of the liquidity in circulation of the aggregate 
production, resulting in a higher price stability for the whole economy.  
 
The third and last rule, which is most often implemented by the central bank, and in particular 
by the ECB, is the pursuit of an inflation target. The central bank changes the money supply 
in accordance with the actual level of inflation and its target level. For this option, the Taylor 
Rule can be considered a possible integration for the monetary policy; this means that it is not 
used as dogma by the ECB, but it can help the central bank in the conduction of the policy 
and, thus, its  pursuit of price stability. The Taylor Rule can constitute a possible short-term 
operational procedure that the ECB can use to reach its long-term target (price stability). 
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Thus, two important variables are included in the formulation of this rule. The first variable is 
the inflation target in accordance with the objective of the ECB. The second variable is the 
output gap, which illustrates the actual economic situation of the country and the actual, pos-
sible pressure due to inflation. 
 
The original formulation of the Taylor Rule illustrates a theoretical definition of the interest 
rate by a central bank. In particular, it considers the output gap, the target level of inflation 
and its actual level; the rule is explained as follows (Alcidi et al., 2016): 
 
𝑖!! = 𝑟∗ + 𝜋! + 0.5 𝜋! − 𝜋!∗ + 0.5𝑦!! 
where: 
𝑖!!  : The level of the nominal interest rate; 
𝑟∗ : The level of the long-term real equilibrium interest rate; 
𝜋! : The current level of the inflation rate; 
𝜋∗ : The target level of the inflation rate; 
𝑦!! : The level of the output gap. 
 
In its original formulation, a key feature of the Taylor Rule is that it attributes an equal weight 
to the level of inflation and to the level of the output gap. In fact, the coefficients in the equa-
tion are both equal to 0.5; however, Taylor’s idea is that the central bank should react to actu-
al inflation with a factor of 1.5, since the main mandate of the central bank is to stabilise pric-
es. Numerous economists have tested the application of the Taylor Rule, and they discovered 
that such a relationship describes the fluctuation of the interest rate for the US as well as other 
countries, such as those in Europe, over the last 15–20 years.  
 
However, it is clear that, in reality, no central banks rigidly follow the Taylor Rule; in fact, at 
the moment the monetary policy is implemented, they also consider other variables and other 
models that can help them identify the best monetary solution. The Taylor Rule did not pro-
vide a convincing answer during the financial crisis of 2008; moreover, the common mone-
tary policy of reduction of the interest rate by the ECB and by the FED did not produce any 
kind of results. In fact, as seen in Figure 5, all the main central banks, the ECB, the FED and 
the BOJ, have a very low interest rate, almost equal to 0. A further decrease in the interest rate 
under the so-called zero lower bound  (ZLB) level would not have produced any results in any 
of the countries. 
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Figure 5: Month money market rates (monthly averages; percentages per annum). 
 
Source: ECB bulletin (2019). 
 
From the information presented in Figure 5, it is clear that all of the major countries have 
slipped into a liquidity trap, so the interest rate is too low to implement any kind of monetary 
policy. The situation can be illustrated, as seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Money demand, money supply and the liquidity trap. 
 
Source: Blanchard et al. (2010). 
 
Point B perfectly describes the liquidity trap; in particular, since the interest rate is equal to 
0%, individuals are indifferent to the holding of currency or bonds because they do not yield 
any kind of interest. Thus, any attempt to increase the monetary supply 𝑀!′′ is  useless. This 
is represented by point C in Figure 6.  
4.6 Money market interest rates
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4.6.1 Money market rates for the euro area, the United States and Japan
(percentages per annum; period averages)
 
   
   Euro area 1), 2) United States Japan
Overnight 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 3-month 3-month
deposits deposits deposits deposits deposits deposits deposits
(EONIA) (EURIBOR) (EURIBOR) (EURIBOR) (EURIBOR) (LIBOR) (LIBOR)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2016   -0.32 -0.34 -0.26 -0.17 -0.03 0.74 -0.02
2017   -0.35 -0.37 -0.33 -0.26 -0.15 1.26 -0.02
2018   -0.36 -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.17 2.31 -0.05
 
2018 Q3   -0.36 -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.17 2.34 -0.04
         Q4   -0.36 -0.37 -0.32 -0.25 -0.14 2.62 -0.10
2019 Q1   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.23 -0.11 2.69 -0.08
         Q2   -0.37 -0.37 -0.32 -0.25 -0.15 2.51 -0.07
         Q3   -0.38 -0.42 -0.40 -0.38 -0.33 2.20 -0.09
 
2018 Sep.   -0.36 -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.17 2.35 -0.04
         Oct.   -0.37 -0.37 -0.32 -0.26 -0.15 2.46 -0.08
         Nov.   -0.36 -0.37 -0.32 -0.26 -0.15 2.65 -0.10
         Dec.   -0.36 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24 -0.13 2.79 -0.10
2019 Jan.   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24 -0.12 2.77 -0.08
         Feb.   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.23 -0.11 2.68 -0.08
         Mar.   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.23 -0.11 2.61 -0.07
         Apr.   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.23 -0.11 2.59 -0.06
         May   -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24 -0.13 2.53 -0.07
         June   -0.36 -0.38 -0.33 -0.28 -0.19 2.40 -0.07
         July   -0.37 -0.40 -0.36 -0.35 -0.28 2.29 -0.07
         Aug.   -0.36 -0.41 -0.41 -0.40 -0.36 2.16 -0.10
         Sep.   -0.40 -0.45 -0.42 -0.39 -0.34 2.13 -0.09
 
Source: ECB.
1) Before January 1999 synthetic euro area rates were calculated on the basis of national rates weighted by GDP. For further information, see the General Notes.
2) Data refer to the changing composition of the euro area. For further information, see the General Notes.
4.6.2 Euro area money market rates  1), 2)  
(monthly averages; percentages per annum)
4.6.3 3-month money market rates






















































Source: ECB. Source: ECB.
1) Before January 1999 synthetic euro area rates were calculated on the basis of national rates weighted by GDP. For further information, see the General Notes.
2) Data refer to the changing composition of the euro area. For further information, see the General Notes.
1), 2)
● Open market operations in which the central bank increases the money supply by buying
bonds lead to an increase in the price of bonds and a decrease in the interest rate.
● Open market operations in which the central bank decreases the money supply by selling
bonds lead to a decrease in the price of bonds and an increase in the interest rate.
Let us take up three more issues before moving on.
The liquidity trap
In the previous section, we assumed that the central bank could always affect the interest
rate, by changing the money supply. However, there is a limit to what the central bank can
do: it cannot decreas  he interest rate b low zero.
Go back first to our characterisation of the demand and the supply of money in Sec-
tion 4.1. There we drew the demand for money, for a given level of income, as a decreasing 
function of the interest rate. The lower the interest rat , the larger the demand for money –
equivalently, the smaller the demand for bonds. What we did not ask is what happens when
the interest rate goes down to zero. The answer: once people hold enough money for trans-
action purposes, they are then indifferent between holding the rest of their financial wealth
in the form of money or in the form of bonds. The reason they are indifferent: both money
and bonds pay the same interest rate: zero. Thus, the demand for money is as shown in
Figure 4.6:
● As the interest rate decreases, people want to hold more money (and thus fewer bonds):
the demand for money therefore increases.
● As the interest rate becomes equal to zero, people want to hold an amount of money at
least equal to the distance OB. This is what they need for transaction purposes, but they
are willing to hold even more money (and therefore hold fewer bonds) because they are
indifferent between money and bonds. Therefore, the demand for money beyond point B
becomes horizontal.
Now consider the effects of an increase in the money supply:
● Consider a case in which the m ney supply is M s, so the int rest rate consistent with
financial market equilibrium is positive and equal to i. (This is the case we considered 
in Section 4.1.) Starting from that equilibrium in Figure 4.6, an increase in the money
supply – a shift of the M s line to the right – leads to a decrease in the interest rate.
● Now consider a case in which the money supply is M s ′, so the equilibrium is at point B; or
the case where the money supply is M s″, so the equilibrium is given at point C. In either
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Look at Figure 4.1. Note how we
avoided the issue by not drawing the





supply and the liquidity
trap
When the interest rate is equal to zero,
and once people have enough money
for transaction purposes, they become
indifferent between holding money and
holding bonds. The demand for money
becomes horizontal. This implies that,
when the interest rate is equal to zero,
further increases in the money supply




Economists have supported different and controversial theories to address this problem. In 
particular, Keynes (1936), and many other economists, supported the theory that during a 
phase characterized by ZLB any central bank is helpless. Monetarists, such as Mishkin 
(1996), used evidence to support the idea that the situation can be solved using by a signifi-
cant amount of liquidity into the system. 
 
To solve the depressed situation and to escape from the liquidity trap, the major central banks 
have  implemented a series of unconventional monetary policies (UMP) to inject liquidity into 
the system; since these policies have resulted in an increase in the amounts listed on the bal-




EUROPEAN QUANTITATIVE EASING 
This chapter will describe the European reaction to the Great Recession as well as the main 
policies implemented by the ECB to solve the depressed European financial situation. Initial-
ly, the chapter will explain the so-called European sovereign debt crisis (Section 2.1), and it 
will then continue with a description of the European turning point, the ‘whatever it takes’ 
(WIT) speech given by Mario Draghi in 2012. This speech ideally divided the initial, weak 
European unconventional monetary policy (Section 2.2) from the effective, strong reaction of 
quantitative easing (QE) by the ECB (Section 2.3). The chapter will also include a detailed 
description of the asset amounts purchased by the ECB, and it will explain the reasoning be-
hind this acquisition. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a description of the main trans-
mission channels of QE (Section 2.4) and an illustration of QE policy in the rest of the world 
(Section 2.5). To evaluate the effectiveness of European QE policy, and because the monetary 
policy of the Federal Reserve (FED) is usually adopted by the ECB as a terms of comparison, 
this last section will mainly focus on the American monetary reaction. However, it will con-
clude with a brief description of the QE implemented by the Bank of England (BOE) and 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) and with a graphical representation of the balance sheets of each central 
bank.  
 
2.1 The real European crisis 
 
This section will explain the European situation after the crisis of 2008; particularly, it will 
analyse the economic condition of some European countries in terms of general government 
gross debt and GDP growth rate. The section will explain the evolution of the sovereign debt 
crisis after the burst of the subprime bubble in the US, and it will then discuss the Securities 
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Market Programme (SMP), the intervention of the ECB. Finally, this section will conclude 
with a presentation of the financial condition of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain) in 2012 compared to Germany.  
 
The previous chapter ended with a discussion of how the most advanced economic countries 
slipped into a liquidity trap. The leading country was the US; in fact, with the burst of the 
subprime bubble and the subsequent crash of the American housing market, the global finan-
cial situation was seriously affected. A general reduction of the interest rate occurred in every 
advanced country, including the European Union. 
 
After the subprime crisis, most European commercial banks were in a bad financial situation. 
Therefore, the main solution adopted by most of the European Union member states was the 
implementation of nationalization policies. The first bank that was nationalized was the 
Northern Rock Bank; it was the fifth largest bank in the UK in 2007, and it was nationalized 
in February 2008. This was one of numerous cases of public intervention directed at helping 
the failing banking system. Other similar cases occurred in many other European Union 
member states, including Portugal, France, Germany, Greece and many others. The govern-
ment of each of these states supported its banking system by issuing loans and warranties and 
implementing recapitalizations and credit lines.  
 
In general, the European Union allocated €3.166 billion to support the weak banking system, 
thus encouraging economic recovery and preventing the possible crash of the European finan-
cial system. However, the large amount of money issued and injected into the system deter-
mined an increase in public debt. As shown in Figure 7, the amount of government debt in 
some major European countries rose in 2008, mainly because of these public interventions. 
Even important and financially stable countries, like Germany, showed a debt increase; be-
tween 2007 and 2010, the German general government debt increased from 63.7% to 81.8% 
of the GDP (Consob, 2011). This negative debt situation was common in Europe and was still 
was higher than the European target in 2018.  
 
This target was identified in article 126(2b) of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Un-
ion (TFEU), which stated the limit of the ratio between the levels of the country’s debt and its 






2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of gov-
ernment debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall exam-
ine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria: 
(a) Whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a 
reference value, unless: - either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a 
level that comes close to the reference value, - or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is 
only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value;  
(b) Whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless 
the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
 
The reference values mentioned in the article are explained and quantified in protocol 12(1). 
They are as follows: 
• 3% for the ratio of planned or actual government deficit to GDP at market prices 
• 60% for the ratio of government debt to GDP at market prices 
Even as the crisis of 2008 ended, these limits were not observed by the European countries to 
which they apply. As mentioned above, the large amount of support provided by the central 
governments created a huge increase in their level of debt, laying the foundation for the sov-
ereign debt crisis of 2012.  
Figure 7: General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP for the main European countries. 
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At the beginning of the crisis, the European situation was heterogeneous; for example, the Eu-
ropean countries presented significant differences in growth rate and public financial condi-
tions. In this way, two sides of the European Union could be distinguished: the ‘core’ Europe-
an countries and the PIIGS countries. The core countries, like Germany, presented a stable 
economic activity and a low level of public debt compared to other European countries. In 
contrast, the PIIGS countries presented a weak economic situation due to the unstable dynam-
ic of public debt, which was exacerbated by the payment of accumulated interests and by re-
cently implemented nationalization policies (Talamo and Di Stefano, 2016).  
 
Figure 8: GDP growth rate (annual %) of Germany and PIIGS. 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Eurostat data. 
 
In addition, the PIIGS countries showed a high level of deficit and a low GDP growth rate. In 
fact, as seen in Figure 8, each of these countries presented a negative GDP growth rate in 
2009. Interestingly, Germany also recorded a negative growth rate in 2009. The country’s 
growth rate for that year was -5.7%, the lowest level among the European states considered 
herein. In 2010, Europe recorded a general economic recovery, during which time European 
GDP growth rates increased again (Figure 9). Among the considered countries, the highest in-
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Figure 9: GDP growth rate (annual %) for the Euro area. 
 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank data. 
 
Despite the 2010 recovery of the European economy as a whole and because of the huge dif-
ferences between countries, the financial situation drastically changed for some European Un-
ion member states when Greece’s bills became public in 2009. In October 2009, Greece’s 
government updated the public financial projections, changing the deficit/GDP ratio from the 
theoretical value of 3.7% to the effective value of 12.7%. Immediately, the Fitch Ratings 
Agency downgraded the rating level of the country from A to A-, and by the end of 2009, the 
country held the rating level of BBB+. This event stands as the beginning of the real Europe-
an crisis; while the crisis of 2008 weakly affected the European Union member states, the 
sovereign debt crisis caused a general downgrade in creditworthiness for numerous countries. 
The main states that showed this downgrading and, therefore, recorded a significant increase 
in payment of accumulated interests were Portugal and Ireland (in the period immediately af-
ter Greece’s case) as well as Spain and Italy (in the subsequent period).  
 
To solve the dramatic and dangerous situation caused by the Greek economic concealment, 
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) instituted the SMP in May 
2010. The SMP focused on the purchase of an unspecified amount of government bonds in 
secondary markets to monitor the spread’s dynamic. During that year, the European Union 
and IMF granted a loan of €110 billion to save Greece from default. This was merely the first 
intervention; in November of the same year, the European Union and IMF granted two other 
loans. The first one was directed to the Irish Central Bank for an amount of €85 billion (equal 
to almost 55% of Ireland’s GDP), and the second loan for €78 billion was granted to the Por-










































































from the rating level of A+ to BBB+, and it downgraded Portugal’s rating level from A+ to 
AA-.  
 
Due to this change in rating, the crisis intensified for these countries. In general, the down-
grading of a government’s ratings causes a reduction in the creditworthiness of the country, 
and this creates, in turn, a series of negative effects. One possible negative effect is the reduc-
tion of foreign investments in the country’s bonds; a low rating is associated with a higher 
level of risk, so investors are discouraged from investing in that specific country. Another 
negative effect is GDP contraction; the higher probability of default creates a higher interest 
rate, and in turn, this reduces domestic investments. Diminishing domestic investments causes 
a contraction of production, thus worsening the financial condition of the country.  
 
This perfectly describes what happened in Italy, which was affected by the crisis in 2011 
when the return on treasury bills reached 7%, showing a progressive accumulation of debt. 
Therefore, the Fitch Rating Agency downgraded the Italian government bonds from AA- to 
A+. During this period, the value of the spread between BTP and BUND (German treasury 
bills) moved from 200 basis points (bp) to the highest peak of 570 bp in November 2011. This 
caused many investors, who were nervous about the unstable financial situation in Italy, to 
deposit their money in countries like Germany, which were evaluated as ‘safe’ by the agen-
cy’s rating. This phenomenon, or ‘flight to quality’, damaged and aggravated the Italian eco-
nomic condition, decreasing the state’s likelihood of recovery (Consob, 2011). 
 
2.2 The European Union initial reaction to the crisis 
 
The ECB reacted differently during the years of crisis, and two difference phases can be dis-
tinguished during which time the ECB implemented several monetary policy countermeas-
ures. The first period included the ECB’s immediate reaction after the American crisis of 
2008, while the second phase was started by the WIT speech of 2012. This section will focus 
on the initial phase of reaction. 
 
During the first phase, the ECB’s reaction to the crisis of 2008 did not diverge from the initial 
reaction of the FED; immediately after the burst of the subprime crisis, both central banks re-
duced the interest rate to incentivise economic recovery. However, despite the common poli-
cies implemented by different global central banks, a comparison of the early interventions of 
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the ECB, FED, BOE and BOJ reveals some differences, particularly in terms of time. As seen 
in Figure 10, the ECB’s reduction of the interest rate in 2008 occurred with some delay com-
pared to that of the other countries; the FED had reduced the interest rate already in 2007 
(Reisenbichler, 2019). 
 
Figure 10: The European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Japan (BOJ) and Bank of England (BOE) 
main policy rates 
 
Source: Fawley and Neely (2013). 
 
Between October 2008 and May 2009, the ECB tried to implement some credit enhancement 
measures to support the interbank market and compensate for the contraction of global sales. 
During this time, it reduced the main refinancing rate by 325 bp, causing the rate to reach a 
value of 1%. The ECB also extended the maturity of long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs); in October 2008, it raised their regular maturity from 3 months to 6 months and 
subsequently increased their maturity to 12 months. Moreover, the ECB also launched its first 
covered bond purchase programme (CBPP1) with the intention of reviving a relevant market 
that had always represented an important source of financing for European banks. Through 
this programme, the ECB purchased €60 billion in securities and, in combination with the im-
plementation of these measures, it extended the list of eligible assets. As seen in Figure 11, 
the first set of countermeasures in 2008 increased the size of the ECB’s balance sheet to a lev-
el higher than €2 trillion (Micossi, 2015). 
 
illustrates the convergence of policy rates toward the zero lower bound in lat  2008 to early 2009.
Initially, the Fed, BOE, BOJ, and ECB policies focused on restoring function to dysfunctional
financial markets, but concern soon shifted to stimulating real growth and preventing undesir-
able disinflation. 
The Fed and BOE QE programs fundamentally differed from those of the BOJ and ECB,
however, by concentrating on bond purchases rather than lending directly to banks. Bond mar-
kets play a relatively mor  important rol  than banks in the U.S. and U.K. economi s, while banks
play a relatively more important role in continental Europe and Japan. Each central bank chose
methods to provide liquidity and support the financial system that reflected the structure of its
respective economy. 
The Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The financial market turmoil—soaring risk premia,
illiquidity—that followed Lehman Brother’s September 2008 bankruptcy prompted monetary
and fiscal authorities to provide emergency dollar liquidity to financial and nonfinancial firms
on both sides of the Atlantic.9 Figure 2 presents a timeline showing dates on which the central
banks announced QE asset purchases/lending programs. The first wave of such programs
(October 2008–May 2009) came on the heels of a wide range of emergency responses to the
Lehman bankruptcy. On September 18, the Fed expanded its foreign exchange swap lines with
foreign central banks, and on October 13 it announced that its swap lines with the BOE, ECB,
and the Swiss National Bank would accommodate any quantity of funds demanded. On
Fawley and Neely
















Fed, ECB, BOJ, and BOE Main Policy Rates
NOTE: The main policy rates for the Fed, ECB, BOJ, and BOE are, respectively, the federal funds target rate, the main refinancing operations
fixed/minimum bid rate, the uncollateralized overnight call rate, and the official Bank rate.
SOURCE: Fed, ECB, BOJ, and BOE.
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Figure 11: The balance sheet of the Federal Reserve (FED) and the ECB (2003 to 2015; trillions of 
dollars or Euros). 
 
Source: Micossi (2015). 
 
The second phase of ECB reactions started with Greece’s public announcement of a huge in-
crease in the debt/GDP ratio and the start of the European sovereign debt crisis, as explained 
previously. Although the initial solution implemented by the ECB in 2010 was the introduc-
tion of the SMP, the purchase of public and private sector debt securities in the secondary 
market was sterilized by weekly fixed-term deposit transactions. The main purpose of the 
programme was preventing the injection of too much liquidity into the banking system, but 
the main problem associated with the SMP was that the ECB did not reveal the amount of 
money designated for the purchases. Moreover, the ECB did not disclose the set of securities 
to be targeted. In this way, the programme produced lower than expected results, and there-
fore, its market impact was strongly reduced.  
 
As seen in Figure 12, the SMP mainly concentrated on purchases of securities during its im-
plementation (May 2010) and in August 2011. In March 2011, the programme was temporari-
ly suspended apparently because of the European Council’s rejection of the European stability 
mechanism (ESM), which should have had the power of operating in the secondary bond 
market. The SMP was reactivated in August 2011 when the ECB purchased a large amount of 
Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds, but once Berlusconi’s government showed no intention 
to implement the promised reforms, the programme was indefinitely suspended. In September 
2011, the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) replaced the SMP. 
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orderly liquidity conditions in distressed markets. The question of the ECB role as lender of 
last resort in sovereign debt markets had come to occupy centre stage. 
4. The ECB responses to financial shocks  
There were two distinct phases in the financial crisis in the Eurozone. In 2008-09 the post-
Lehman shock emanating from US capital markets was met without special strains in 
internal cohesion – as reflected in only mildly widening spreads between Eurozone markets 
(Figure 5). Just like the Federal Reserve and the other main central banks, the ECB reacted by 
lowering interest rates and massively expanded its refinancing operations for the banking 
system. Its lending of last resort operations with the banking system were massive and 
effective, with little disagreement within the Governing Council.   
























































































Source: ECB and FRED (Economic Data, St. Louis FED), weekly data. 
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Figure 12: The ECB Securities Market Programme. 
 
Source: Micossi (2015). 
 
Because of the turbulence in the Italian and Spanish financial markets, the ECB decided to 
purchase an additional €40 billion covered bonds (CBPP2) in October 2011 destined to them. 
Italy and Spain represented some potential problems for the European Union. In fact, at the 
end of 2011, the idea that Greece would leave the European Union was well established in 
Europe, and Italy and Spain represented two potential similar cases due to their poor financial 
situations.  
 
In fact, despite the launch of two very long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs) with a ma-
turity of 3 years, and despite the reduction of the minimum reserve requirement from the val-
ue of 2% to 1%, the actual situation of these countries remained problematic. During the first 
VLTRO in December 2011, more than 500 European commercial banks benefitted from the 
implementation of such a policy; they received funds equal to €490 billion. In addition, the 
ECB designated an estimated €530 billion for more than 800 European commercial banks 
during the second VLTRO in February 2012. However, the Italian and Spanish banking sys-
tems were still weak. 
 
The situation radically changed on 26 July 2012, when the ECB’s president Mario Draghi 
gave his famous speech in London: ‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’ (Mario Draghi, 26 July 2012). 
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In fall 2011, as a predictable reaction to the Greek PSI, the sovereign crisis started to mutate 
into a banking crisis, as investors eyed the potential repercussions of a sovereign default on 
the solvency of banking institutions with large exposures to sovereign risks; the emerging 
banking crisis in turn worsened th  market assessments of sovereig  solvency, as investors 
factored in the prospect of further capital injections by governments into the banking system 
to keep banks afloat. The doom loop between sovereign and banking crises had set in. Soon 
the major agencies started to downgrade in parallel the ratings of sovereigns and banks, 
adding to market strains; interbank and wholesale money market funding to banks in the 
periphery seized up. The crunch was aggravated by the ill-timed decision by the EU Heads 
of State and Government (in October 2011, acting on a proposal by the EBA) to require banks 
to raise their capital to a 9% regulatory ratio,18 entailing increased capital requirements of 
about €100 billion. 
In a rapidly deteriorating environment, the ECB rushed to accommodate the funding needs 
of banks. The minimum reserve requirement was lowered from 2% to 1%. In addition, the 
ECB launched two ‘very-long-term’ refinancing operations (VLTROs) – in December 2011 
and February 2012 – with a maturity of three years; the amount drawn totalled over €1 
                                                     
18




His speech represented the real turning point for financially stressed countries like Italy, Spain 
and Greece.  
With this speech, the ECB implemented the OMT. The announcement of this programme was 
vital for Italy, Spain and Greece; under the OMT, the ECB and the NCBs were ready to oper-
ate in the countries’ secondary sovereign-bond markets by purchasing unlimited amounts of 
bonds with maturity below 3 years with no pre-specified time limit. However, the ECB im-
posed a condition on the states involved in the OMT programme. It forced the states to sign 
an economic plan in accordance with the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) author-
ity. The OMT never needed to be implemented, though; the simple announcement that the 
ECB was ready to save every European Union member state was enough to calm the market. 
As a result of the announcement, the Italian and Portuguese spreads reduced by 100 bp and 
180 bp, respectively, from July 2012 to September 2012 (Talamo and Di Stefano, 2016). 
 
In this way, the ECB ideally accepted the role of lender of last resort, although it has never 
explicitly accepted this function, mainly due to possible moral hazards. In fact, the ECB still 
believes that, because the states know that it is always at their disposal to purchase an unlim-
ited amount of sovereign bonds, they are incentivised to issue an excessive amount of debt. 
The implementation of such measures produced a positive effect in Italy, Spain and Greece; in 
fact, the OMT announcement increased the financial stability of these countries and reduced 
the flight to quality phenomenon. 
 
2.3 ECB Quantitative Easing 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the European unconventional monetary policy, its composi-
tion must first be analysed. This section will explain in detail the unconventional monetary 
policies adopted by the ECB since the WIT speech in 2012, and it will illustrate the reasoning 
behind such unconventional measures. Since the main result of these policies was an increase 
in the ECB’s balance sheet, they are commonly referred to as QE. The section will conclude 
with the last programme announced by the ECB, which ended in December 2018. However, 
this programme was extended by the ECB in October 2019 to increase and facilitate banking 
credit inside Europe. 
 
With the European sovereign debt crisis, the ECB discovered that previously used conven-
tional monetary policies were completely useless. Because it aimed to incentivise a faster 
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economic recovery of the continent, the ECB tried to implement other provisions—the so-
called European unconventional measures. Some examples of these unconventional measures 
include the already implemented SMP and VLTROs. These provisions were executed before 
the interest rate reached the ZLB value, and they can be seen as a sort of extension of the 
ECB’s role of lender of last resort. The implementation of such measures produced discrete 
results.  
 
However, once the interest rate reached the ZLB and the focus of the ECB moved from the 
stabilization of the European banking system to the stimulation of European real growth and 
reduction of deflation, the Eurotower researched other solutions. The ECB then decided to 
implement some countermeasures to reduce the long-term interest rate; after all, the short-
term interest rate had reached ZLB, and therefore, it was impossible for the ECB to further 
reduce it. In contrast, the long-term interest rate remained positive, even when the short-term 
rate reached 0%. 
 
The ECB used two different techniques to reduce the long-term interest rate. The first instru-
ment was forward guidance. Through this tool, the ECB tried to influence the interest rate ex-
pectations, announcing in advance that the low-rate policy would remain in force for a long 
period of time, not just temporarily. The second method implemented by the ECB was the 
purchase of a large number of long-term assets. Through this purchase, the ECB increased the 
price of these assets and set in motion the so-called portfolio balance effect. The intention of 
the ECB was an assets substitution in the private portfolio. These two techniques were not 
mutually exclusive; implementation of the first method did not preclude adoption of the se-
cond. As mentioned above, these unconventional measures are referred to as QE because they 
caused a huge increase in the overall size of the central bank’s balance sheet. 
 
Despite the ECB’s implementation of previous measures, the value of the long-term interest 
rates did not decrease enough. Comparison of the 10-year government bond yield of the ECB 
with that of other central banks like the FED and the BOE shows that the reduction of long-
term interest rates was higher for the FED and BOE. Both the FED and BOE reduced the 10-
year government bond yield to a value lower than the GDP growth rate, thus reducing the in-
terest burden for these countries. Such was not the case for the ECB. In fact, as shown in Fig-
ure 13, the ECB was not able to reduce the 10-year government bond yield so that its value 
was lower than the nominal GDP growth rate of Europe. This can be considered one of the 
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many reasons for the lower impact of QE in Europe than in other countries (Bini Smaghi, 
2014). 
 
Figure 13: Nominal GDP growth rate and 10-years government bond yield. 
  
 
Source: Bini Smaghi (2014). 
 
After the WIT speech and the launch of the VLTROs, the ECB decided to implement further 
measures to support the private sector and encourage, as much as possible, private credit and 
the banks’ supply of loans. Therefore, it launched two different programmes at the end of 
2014. The first was a new covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) begun in October 
2014, and the second one was the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) 
started in November of the same year.  
 
In addition, the ECB announced a series of targeted long-term refinancing operations 
(TLTROs) in June 2014. Moreover, it decided to reduce the deposit facility rate to a negative 
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2000s, including intermittently also after the launch in 2013 of the new QE programme by the 
Bank of Japan. In the eurozone, on the other hand, financial policies did not help reduce the 
interest burden, as long-term interest rates hovered well above nominal GDP growth rates 
through much of 2014.  
Figure 14. Nominal GDP growth and 10-year government bond yield 
 
Source: Bini Smaghi (2014). 
 
In sum, one cannot underestimate the importance of balance sheet repair and deleveraging 
in explaining the apparent slow response of the economy to monetary easing – notably in the 
banking system, where the stricter capital rules decided in Basel have combined with the 
need to clean up balance sheets in estraining the supply of credit. It does provide some 
support for the conclusion that “central bank securities purchases have provided meaningful 
support to the economic recovery while mitigating deflationary risks” (Bernanke, 2012).40  
The benefits for QE policies must also be weighed against the potential costs, on which a full 
picture will not be available for quite some time. The list of potential drawbacks includes the 
                                                     
40 An entirely different question, which cannot be tackled here, is whether the economies of advanced 
countries will revert to their pre-crisis growth path, or more broadly what their long-term growth path is 
expected to be. On this, the spring 2015 WEO (International Monetary Fund, 2015b: Chapter 3) finds that 
potential output may have been permanently reduced by the crisis, mainly due to the sharp fall in investment 
in recent years. The responsiveness of wages to falling unemployment seems also to have declined, possibly 
weakening the impact of expansionary monetary policy on inflation. On this, cf. The Economist, “When what 
comes down doesn’t go up”, 2 May 2015. 
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value (-0.10%) for the first time. In this way, the ECB tried to stimulate the aggregate demand 
and incentivise banks to issue loans to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs). As 
seen in Figure 8, the amount of loans issued by banks to households and NFCs had reduced 
drastically from May 2011, particularly in the case of loans to NFCs. Through the ECB’s ac-
tions, the amount of loans increased; however, this increase was still far from the ECB’s tar-
get (Demertzis and Wolff, 2016). 
 
Figure 14: Loans to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs; year-on-year growth, %). 
 
Source: Demertzis and Wolff (2016). 
 
Despite the introduction of these numerous programmes, the economic situation of the coun-
tries was still very weak. Moreover, the lower-than-expected increase in the level of Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), a measurement that represents the consumer infla-
tion level, forced the ECB Governing Council to launch an expanded asset purchase pro-
gramme (APP), under which the ECB purchased monthly assets for an amount approximately 
equal to €60 billion from March 2015 to the end of September 2016.  
 
The APP launched by Mario Draghi in January 2015 included the following: 
• ABSPP 
• CBPP3 
• The public sector purchase programme (PSPP) 
 
Under the PSPP, the ECB planned to purchase €50 billion of securities in the secondary mar-
ket every month for the entire period until September 2016. The idea was for the ECB to con-
12 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚20 | 2016
Figure A2: Contributions to real GDP growth (growth contribution, %)
Source: Eurostat. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) Announcement of PPP; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
Figure A3: Euro area gross fixed capital formation (real year-on-year growth, %)
Source: Eurostat and European Central Bank. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) PSPP Announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) 
CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
Figure A4: Loans to households and non-financial corporations (year-on-year 
growth, %)
Source: Eurostat and European Central Bank. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) PSPP Announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) 
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tinue purchasing assets until the level of the inflation returned to the European target level. 
The PSPP announced by the ECB planned the acquisition of bonds issued by the European 
Union member states and by some national agencies for an amount equal to €836 billion and 
securities issued by certain European institutions for an amount of €114 billion. The monthly 
purchase of the ECB for the period from March 2015 to September 2016 included 19 months, 
so the entire amount of the programme was established around €950 billion (19 months x €50 
billion).  
 
To the PSPP’s monthly cost of €50 billion must be added the monthly €10 billion of the 
ABSPP and CBPP3. Therefore, to the initial value of €950 billion must be added €190 billion 
(19 months x €10 billion). Thus, the programme was equal to €1.4 trillion; in this way, the 
balance sheet of the ECB was reduced to the pre-crisis level.  
 
The 8% of sovereign and the 12% of securities of the monthly €50 billion were held by the 
ECB on its account. Therefore, the risk associated with these purchases was shared among the 
European Union member states. The remaining part of the monthly €50 billion was designat-
ed for the purchase of national public securities, and it was allocated to each NCB in accord-
ance with the capital-key criteria. Table 2 explains the allocation of the monthly asset pur-
chase under the APP from March 2015 to September 2016 (Micossi, 2015). 
 
Table 2: The allocation of monthly asset purchases by the Eurosystem. 
Bonds Bondholder Monthly purchase Total Purchase 
ABS and Covered Bonds ECB €10 billion €190 billion 
European institutions ECB 
€6 billion 
(12% of €50 billion) 
€114 billion 




(8% of €50 billion) 
€76 billion 




(80% of €50 billion) 
€760 billion 
TOTAL  €60 billion €1.14 trillion 
Source: Micossi (2015). 
 
The ECB’s governing council decided to expand the APP in March 2016. It introduced a 
CSPP mainly directed at increasing and facilitating the bank’s credit to NFCs. In addition, the 
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ECB launched a new series of TLTROs (TLTRO II) with a maturity of 4 years. Therefore, the 
ECB continued the programme that would have ended in September 2016.  
 
The last phase of the APP ended on December 2018. As seen in Figure 15, the number of se-
curities purchased from 2015 to 2018 drastically increased during that time, due to the ECB’s 
intensification of the PSPP and CBPP3.  
 




The average pace of monthly purchases conducted by the ECB under the APP since the early 
implementation in March 2015 can be summarized as follows (Figure 16; European Central 
Bank, 2019): 
• €60 billion from March 2015 to March 2016  
• €80 billion from April 2016 to March 2017 
• €60 billion from April 2017 to December 2017  
• €30 billion from January 2018 to September 2018  








The ECB has been criticized by some economists because it waited too long to implement 
such unconventional measures. Even members of the ECB’s governing council, such as Or-
phanides in 2017 and Honohan in 2018, criticized the ECB’s reaction. In their opinion, the 
ECB should have acted earlier and with more determination. According to them, the main 
reason for the delay was that the ECB’s self-imposed constraints were more imagined than re-
al, due to an over-interpretation of the ECB Statute (Neri and Siviero, 2019). 
 
2.4 The main transmission channels of Quantitative Easing 
 
The ECB’s adoption of unconventional monetary measures affected the real economy through 
different channels (Neri and Siviero, 2019). This section will explain the main transmission 
channels through which the European QE policy produced such results. 
 
• The signalling channel and the scarcity channel 
The signalling channel and the scarcity channel are strongly linked. When the ECB 
bought some financial assets, this purchase generated two different effects. The first was 
an increase in the price of the asset due to the reduction of its risk-free component. Since 
the asset was purchased by the ECB, the risk associated with the asset was reduced; thus, 
its price increased. This describes the signalling channel. The second effect was the de-
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cline of the premium component due to the scarcity channel. Investors preferred to buy 
the assets purchased by the ECB, but the amount of these assets was lower; therefore, the 
investors were forced to accept a lower yield for them. 
 
• The excess liquidity channel 
The ECB’s purchase of a large amount of assets caused an increase of the liquidity inside 
the interbank market. Since the amount of money inside the system was higher than be-
fore, the interest rate in the interbank market decreased. This incentivised banks to offer 
loans to the real economy and even to each other. 
 
• The confidence channel 
The implementation of the QE by the ECB produced effects in terms of reputation. The 
programme showed the strong intent of the ECB to reach its inflation target, thus increas-
ing the credibility of the central bank. This, in turn, produced positive effects on the infla-
tion expectations of the consumers and the investors, who were then incentivised to spend 
money. 
 
• The portfolio-rebalancing channel 
The purchase of one type of asset by the ECB caused an increase in the price and a reduc-
tion of the yield of that specific asset. As a result, investors tried to find another category 
of asset that produced a higher yield. This, in turn, caused an increase in the price and a 
reduction of the yields of the second category of assets. The mechanism continued this 
cycle, thus producing a general increase in the level of prices of each category of assets. 
 
• The exchange rate channel 
The reduction of the yield of the domestic assets was associated with an increase in the 
yields of foreign assets. In other words, investors preferred to buy foreign assets due to 
their higher gain. As a result, the demand of foreign currency increased, causing a depre-
ciation of the domestic currency. In turn, the domestic depreciation of the exchange rate 







• The government budget constraint channel 
The decline of the yields produced a positive effect for the governments’ debts. The State 
then could save money by lowering the cost of debt and using these saved funds to incen-
tivise the real economy, thus reducing financial constraints and encouraging private con-
sumption and investments. 
 
2.5 Quantitative easing in the US and the rest of the world 
 
This section will explain the QE policy in the rest of the world, particularly in the US, UK and 
Japan. Since the main focus of this thesis is the evaluation of European QE, a useful means of 
comparison is the monetary countermeasures implemented by the FED during the distressing 
period. For this reason, the American case will be more deeply analysed than the QE policies 
of other countries. In addition, because the American countermeasures were executed imme-
diately after the crisis of 2008, the Wall Street meltdown will be briefly analysed to better un-
derstand the reasoning behind the FED purchases at the early stage. 
 
On 15 November 2008, Lehman Brothers, one of the major banks in the US, failed, causing 
the so-called Great Recession to strike the world. Beginning in the US, this was the largest 
crisis since 1929, and it rapidly affected all other advanced countries. The main cause behind 
the crisis was the burst of the housing bubble. Before the crisis, the housing market was 
strongly incentivised by the American government due to the following reasons: 
 
• Politicians’ desire to provide one house to every American, including ethnic minorities 
• Politicians’ hope of giving back some stimulus to the American economy, which had 
been strongly affected by the dot.com bubble in 2000 and later by the terrorist attack 
in 2001 
• Politicians’ desire to reduce the enormous commercial imbalance that the American 
economy presented with respect to the other countries, particularly China. 
 
A large stimulus to the expansion of the housing market was given through the introduction of 
some new and complex financial instruments. The first was the securitization process, which 
mainly involved American mortgages. Securitization includes an originator of the mortgage 
(the bank), which gives the credit to a vehicle company created ad hoc to receive such loans. 
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This company is called the special purpose vehicle (SPV). In exchange for the credit, the bank 
receives an equal amount of liquidity, allowing the bank with the received funds to offer addi-
tional mortgages to other individuals. In turn, the SPV uses these credits as a guarantee to is-
sue some bonds, which are named differently in relation to their underlying. In general, the 
bonds are called asset-backed securities (ABS), but when the underlying is a mortgage, they 
are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When private or public debt is the underlying, 
they are called collateralized debt obligation (CDO), and in the case of very short-term credits 
they are called asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Any type of asset can be securitized, 
but normally it is an asset with periodical cash flows. For this reason, the most common form 
of securitization is one with home equity mortgages. 
 
Generally, securitization converts an asset or group of assets into a marketable security and 
creates liquidity in the marketplace for an amount equal to the value of the assets being secu-
ritized. Usually, the securitized assets are divided into different layers or tranches, which are 
tailored to the investment risk tolerance of different types of investors. For instance, the lower 
risk layer may be purchased by pension funds seeking a secure, steady return, while the higher 
risk layer might be purchased by hedge funds willing to take a risk on mortgages that may or 
may not be paid off. 
 
Once the MBS is created by the SPV, it is sold in the secondary market to the participants, 
and the coupon’s payments are no longer guaranteed by the bank, but depend on the SPV. In 
turn, the SPV’s payments depend on the payments of the mortgages by the individuals. There-
fore, when the individuals become insolvent, the whole process collapses. This is exactly 
what happened in the case of the US crisis of 2008. With the burst of the housing financial 
bubble, the American economy collapsed, and its problems propagated in the European econ-
omy.  
 
The American reaction to the crisis was immediate; as seen in Figure 17, the FED had already 
started to decrease the effective interest rate since 2006, and when this rate reached the ZLB 
in 2008, the FED immediately implemented QE (Coughlin, 2018).  
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Figure 17: Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Federal Reserve Economic data. 
 
The QE adopted by the FED can be summarized in three main phases: QE1, QE2 and QE3. 
The first phase of the American QE (QE1) was implemented in 2008 in concomitance with 
the default of the Lehman Brothers. The FED decided to designate a large amount of liquidity 
to the housing market for two main reasons: (1) this sector had been severely affected by the 
crisis, and (2) the sector represented a possible transmission channel for a faster and easier re-
covery for the US economy. For this reason, an APP of $500 billion was backed by the two 
government-sponsored housing enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and these funds 
were mainly directed to the purchase of MBS and the reduction of mortgage rates. QE1 ended 
in 2009, and the FED purchased about $1.725 trillion of assets. The second phase of QE 
(QE2) started in 2010. It was different from the previous one; this new APP included $600 
billion purchases of treasury bonds. In fact, the FED was no longer interested only in the re-
duction of the mortgage rate but was also focused on the reduction of overall long-term inter-
est rates. The third and final round of American QE (QE3) started in 2012 and consisted of 
monthly purchases of $40 billion in MBS and $45 billion in treasuries. To summarize, the 
American QE implemented by the FED beginning in 2008 produced a large increase of the 
FED’s balance sheet; from 2008 to 2018, the FED’s balance sheet increased more than 450%, 
from the initial value of $900 billion to the final value of $4.5 trillion in 2018. This final value 
in 2018 included $1.8 trillion in MBS and $2.5 trillion in treasury bonds. 
 
This was the behaviour of the FED, but some other countries like the UK and Japan also ex-
perienced the Great Recession, and the American crisis quickly became a worldwide phenom-
enon. To mitigate the financial crisis of 2008, the BOE and BOJ implemented a monetary pol-




























































































































































































The BOE’s APP can be divided into two different phases. During the first phase, the ECB an-
nounced the intention of purchasing high-quality private assets with a limit of £50 billion. 
However, the total amount of private assets that the BOE bought through this policy was just 
£3 billion. In addition, the policy implemented by the BOE was financed by selling short-term 
gilts (the UK’s government bonds); therefore, the BOE’s balance sheet was not affected by 
the adoption of the APP. During the second phase, started in March 2009, the BOE adopted 
an official QE policy. The initial limit imposed on the acquisition of assets was £75 billion; it 
was later increased to £200 billion in November 2009. The main consequence of the English 
QE was the increase of the monetary base. As a result, the balance sheet of the BOE increased 
drastically. The programme was temporarily suspended between February 2009 and October 
2011 and subsequently reactivated; however, from 2008 until 2017, the BOE’s balance sheet 
increased from £94 billion to almost £400 billion. 
 
The situation in Japan was completely different. The BOJ had already started a QE pro-
gramme during the 1990s, one that purchased Japanese government bonds to uplift the Japa-
nese economy. The programme did not produce the expected results because of a weak bank-
ing system; however, in the following year, Japan implemented some structural reforms, like 
the introduction of minimum reserve requirements, to improve the transmission mechanism 
inside the most important system of its economy. The results of such reforms were affected by 
the dot.com bubble and subsequently by the crisis in 2008. The monthly pace purchases by 
the BOJ reached ¥1.2 trillion in 2002 and did not stop in the subsequent years. When the 2008 
crisis hit the Japanese economy, the BOJ announced an unlimited lending of money to the 
commercial banks at a rate almost equal to 0% in order to stimulate and facilitate the recovery 
of its bank-centric economic system. From 2008 to 2012, the dismissal date of the pro-
gramme, the balance sheet of the BOJ increased by an amount almost equal to ¥106.8 trillion.  
 
Figure 18 illustrates how the balance sheets of the main advanced countries increased between 




Figure 18: Total central bank assets in millions of USD, 2008-2017 
 









In	response	 to	the	economic	downturn	 that	started	 in	2007,	the	Federal	Reserve	(Fed)	and	




zero	 (Blinder,	 2010).	 Negative	 interest	 rates	 are	 impractical,	 because	 they	 imply	 that	 the	
depositor	actually	pays	interest	to	a	bank	for	holding	the	depositor’s	money.	With	interest	rates	
near	or	even	below	zero,	central	banks	had	to	find	explore	different	approaches	for	effective	
monetary	 policy,	 which	 they	 did	 in	 choosing	 to	 influence	 prices	 and	 output	 by	 increasing	
liquidity	 through	 the	 purchase	 of	 long-term	 assets,	 like	 government	 bonds	 and	mortgage-
backed	 securities.	 The	 Fed	 was	 the	 first	 central	 bank	 to	 implement	 aggressive	 policies	
following	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis,	 announcing	 it	 would	 purchase	 roughly	 $600	 billion	 in	
mortgage-backed	 securities	 in	 November	 2008.	 Despite	 Fed	 Chairman	 Ben	 Bernanke’s	












time	 of	 extreme	 distress.	 However,	 the	 scope	 of	 policies	 expanded	 over	 time	 to	 include	
achieving	 inflation	 targets,	 stimulating	 the	 real	 economy,	 and	 controlling	 the	 European	
sovereign	 debt	 crisis.	 For	 the	 Fed	 and	 other	 central	 banks,	 implementation	 caused	 major	
changes	 to	 the	 capital	 structure	 of	 the	 bank.	 This	 paper	 specifically	 compares	 the	 Fed,	
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3. CHAPTER 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN 
QUANTITATIVE EASING 
Our work evaluates the effectiveness of European QE, and since the main target of the ECB is 
price stability, we will judge the resultant level of prices after the QE policy. This evaluation 
can be difficult because the European QE is most often compared against those implemented 
by American counterpart. However, this comparison is not precise; in fact, the two continents 
present radical political and economic differences. Another reason is how the numerous stud-
ies conducted during recent years sometimes show discordance with regard to the European 
results, so it is difficult to establish which model better represents the real and effective case; 
moreover, there is also difficulty defining the variables analysed by the models. In particular, 
some models perfectly fit the reality from a theoretical point of view, but empirically do not 
fit at all. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the QE is not imputable just to one reason but 
depends on a large number of possible causes. 
With regard to this, since the principal target of the ECB is price stability, our work focuses 
on the evaluation of price variations among European countries.  
In particular, the first paragraph (3.1) will analyse the inflation rate in Europe and how it 
changed during the years since the introduction of the European Union in 1999; moreover, it 
will try to explain these fluctuations analysing the role of the interest rate’s differences be-
tween the core and peripheral European countries.  
Subsequently, the chapter will analyse the variation of the inflation levels among European 
states following the implementation of the Unconventional Monetary Policies (UMP) by the 
ECB. In particular, it will estimate these variations at the macroeconomic level according to 
the study conducted by Burriel and Galesi (2017) which explains how the prices and outputs 
changed after the UMP shock (3.2). The chapter then addresses the microeconomic level, and, 
in particular, the section will illustrate the New Keynesian Models studied by Galì and Gertler 
(2001). These models use the price stickiness and the degree of backwardness to illustrate in-
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flation levels; research from Schäfer (2018) will be used to illustrate the inflations variation 
during three distinct periods, in particular, the pre-crisis period from 1999 through mid-2007, 
the crisis period until August 2012 and, finally, the “Whatever It Takes” (WIT) period, which 
started with Mario Draghi’s statement in London in 2012 through end-2015.   
 
3.1 Country Inflation differentials  
 
The initial intention of the unconventional countermeasures adopted by the ECB was the sav-
ing of the countries negatively affected by the sovereign debt crisis, but once the economic 
conditions of these countries became sustainable again, the European Central Bank did not 
stop the QE policy. The continuation of the QE and its actual renewal is due to a level of in-
flation still far from the target. 
Thus, we will initially illustrate the changes in the European level of inflation. In particular, 
since the introduction of the European Union in 1999, the European countries experimented 
with systematic variations in inflation which mainly occurred between the peripheral and core 
countries. 
 
Figure 19: Year-Over-Year HICP Inflation Rates for Euro Area Members 
 
Source: European Parliament (2014). 
 
As shown in Figure 19, inflation rates among the European member states sampled showed 
clear variations, but there were also some common trends among them. In particular, from 
Inflation differentials and euro area monetary policy 
 
 
PE 536.283 7 




Though the large number of lines in the chart makes it difficult to use this graph to discuss 
developments in individual countries, it does illustrate a number of trends. 
• While there are clear variations in inflation rates across member states at all times, 
there are also some noticeable common trends.  In particular, inflation was stable in 
most of the member states from 2002 to 2007.   Most states then experienced a 
jump in inflation in 2008 due to oil prices and then a sharp decline in 2009 due to 
the global recession.  After this period, there was a common pattern of rising 
inflation rates through 2011 and early 2012 but this has been followed a strong 
pattern of falling inflation across all member states since mid-2012. 
• The period prior to the global recession saw euro area states such as Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Italy—all of whom have subsequently gone through debt 
crises—record inflation rates that were consistently higher than recorded in 
Germany. 
• There has been a reversal of this pattern in recent years, with Ireland and Greece 
most notably recording lower inflation rates than Germany.  However, this is mainly 
a recent phenomenon and the “debt crisis” countries have still had much larger 
increases in their consumer price levels since the beginning of EMU than core 





2002 to 2007, inflation was stable within these countries; then, in 2008, most experienced a 
jump in inflation, mainly due to increased oil prices. Inflation continued to increase, so, in 
2009, inflation started decreasing as a consequence of the global recession. Inflation rates rose 
again until early 2012; henceforth, inflation began falling; this context allows the so-called 
PIIGS in 2008 to be observed. When paired with the global crisis, these countries presented 
levels of inflation higher than Germany; inflation levels decreased in some countries, specifi-
cally in Greece and Ireland, but mainly because of the sovereign debt crisis. In the following 
years, countries would experience the same distressing situation as Greece, and, in 2014, still 
presented levels of inflation much higher than Germany. To better understand the differences 
between inflation rates among the European countries, it is useful to analyse the wide varia-
tion in interest rates across the states to understand the vast disparities in the interest rates at 
which governments, households and firms could borrow. Figure 21 illustrates that such ine-
quality has been present since 1993, so from a period significantly before the introduction of 
the European Union. 
 
Figure 20: Long-Term Sovereign Bond Yields for Selected Countries 
 
Source: European Parliament (2014). 
 
As seen in Figure 20, interest rates between the PIIGS and Germany had significant dispari-
ties which resulted from differing degrees of reputation among the countries. In particular, 
states with bad reputations presented higher interest rates, and, as a consequence, increased 
the cost of borrowing for those states. For example, Greece presented a negative reputation in 
Europe mainly because of the numerous devaluations of its currency. These actions discour-
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aged the other states from lending money to the Greek government, and this immediately 
raised the country’s interest rates. These differences in interest rates among the countries ap-
parently disappeared with the introduction of the European Union in 1999. Greece reached the 
European interest rate some years later, but, in 2009, at the beginning of the Great Recession, 
this differential re-emerged and negatively affected the financial stability of the weaker and 
more indebted countries (Whelan, 2014). 
From the point of view of a single country, it is possible to see that, for some states, interest 
rates remained fixed or changed very little with the introduction of the European Union. The 
best example of this is Germany, as inflation levels have remained unchanged since 1999; the 
situation radically changed for other countries, where the introduction of the Euro caused a 
huge decrease in the cost of borrowing; the best examples are the cases of Greece and Italy. 
The apparently positive aspects of the reduction of the cost of borrowing, in reality, served as 
the foundation for the future sovereign debt crisis and the actual high level of debt for some 
countries; in particular, for the peripheral countries, the substantial reduction to the cost of 
borrowing facilitated credit debt, and, as a consequence, in these states, the amount of both 
private and public debt increased drastically. Figure 21 better illustrates how the debt posi-
tions of PIIGS deteriorated over the years with respect to Germany. 
 
Figure 21: Current Account Balance as a Percentage of GDP for Selected Countries 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
This huge imbalance has been detrimental for some states; in particular, the main conse-
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of competitiveness because of increased levels of inflation. Since Spanish and Irish goods 
were more expensive than products from other European states, exportations decreased, and, 
instead, importation rates for Spain and Ireland rose. As a consequence, this negatively affect-
ed the countries’ balance of payments.  
The countries with  significant debts needed to move into a path of account surpluses, which, 
in turn, would help them to reduce their international debtor positions; this increase in current 
accounts can occur through stimulating exports. As such, the situations of PIIGS improves 
with respect to the lowest peak in 2008. However, excluding the case of Ireland, their actual 
situation is not so different from that recorded during the sovereign debt crisis in 2013. 
In theory, the PIIGS could obtain significant gains in terms of competitiveness by recording 
negative inflation rates, but two main problems are related to this possible solution: first, the 
workers and the trade unions of these financially stressed countries strongly opposed a possi-
ble reduction of wages, and, second, a possible deflation in these countries would not result in 
cut wages, but, instead, would destroy the labour markets because of numerous layoffs. As a 
consequence, the solution which could be implemented at the European level was to increase 
the levels of inflation in those countries which were reputed to be financially stable and which 
could afford higher inflation rates (the core countries, which included Germany); according to 
the study, this is the best way to potentially rebalance the Euro Area (Whelan, 2014). 
In sum, inflation rates have not been constant nor identical over the years and among the 
countries. The ECB tried to solve problems related to levels of inflation mainly by adopting 
Quantitative Easing; however, actual levels are still far from ideal. Next, we estimate, in de-
tail, the effect of the UMP on levels of inflation and output; since its effects were not homo-
geneous within Europe we will explain the reasons behind such differentials.  
 
3.2 QE effects on countries’ outputs and prices level over the years 
 
A study conducted by Burriel and Galesi (2017) which evaluated the effects of the UMP on 
the prices and levels of output at the national level. This study is based on the analysis of 
macroeconomic variables, which means that prices and outputs are studied in relation to some 
macro variables as the country’s level of real GDP per capita, or for example, the country’s 
level of unemployment.  
We assess the effectiveness of the UMP shocks in Europe and introduce the interesting as-
pects of cross-country interactions, in particular, the spillover effect inside Europe, which 
helps to explain the differing effects recorded at the national levels. Since prices and outputs 
 
48 
were uniquely affected for all European countries, we analyse the other reasons at the base of 
such divergence; moreover, we explain countries’ features which might have dampened the 
effectiveness of the UMP shocks.  
 
Figure 22: Cross-country variation of output responses to a UMP shock 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
Figure 22 shows the effects on output and price variations across Europe. In particular, it is 
possible to distinguish some countries with  more relevant variations and other countries with 
effects which are not statistically significant. The effects on output and prices are positive for 
almost every country, but, according to this, there is a certain degree of heterogeneity. 
 
Figure 23: Cross-country variation of prices responses to a UMP shock 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 





















































Fig. 2. Cross-country variation of responses to a UMP shock. Notes: Maps in the left-hand-side display the median peak responses of output and prices, 
grouped by interquartile ranges, to a one-standard-deviation UMP shock. Charts in the right-hand-side display the median peak responses of output and 
prices (in red dots), joint with the 16th and 84th percentiles (light blue bars). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader 
is referred to the web version of this article.) 
output and 0.033% for prices). The extent of the heterogeneity slightly decreases in the full sample, as the standard devia- 
tion averages 0.044% for output and 0.029% for prices. Overall, the effects estimated over the full sample are in line with 
those obtained in the benchmark model, both in terms of average effects, as well as regarding the extent of the heterogene- 
ity across countries. 9 
To get a further picture of the extent of this heterogeneity in effects, we compare the effects observed in those countries 
which were mostly affected by the recent sovereign debt crisis, and we term them financially stressed , versus the rest of the 
economies. We follow Altavilla et al. (2016) in terming stressed countries Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
and we group countries accordingly. Fig. 4 plots the whole distribution of peak responses in financially stressed countries 
in the y -axis, versus the same distribution of the remaining countries in the x -axis, joint with a 45  degrees line. Each point 
in the graph represents the effects of a single draw, and for comparing across draws we rescale responses so that the UMP 
shock implies an increase of the ECB balance sheet by one percent in each draw. Two results emerge. First, output in finan- 
cially stressed countries increases less than what is observed in the rest of the euro area members. The bulk of points scatter 
below the 45  degr es line (about 87% of the draws), which suggests relatively smaller effects of UMP shocks in financially 
9 The ordering of the countries in terms of magnitude is mostly preserved. The correlation of median peak responses across the two models is about 
78% for prices, and 90% for output. 
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those obtained in the benchmark model, both in terms of average effects, as well as regarding the extent of the heterogene- 
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To get a further picture of the extent of this heterogeneity in effects, we compare the effects observed in those countries 
which were mostly affected by the recent sovereign debt crisis, and we term them financially stressed , versus the rest of the 
economies. We follow Altavilla et al. (2016) in terming stressed countries Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
and we group countries accordingly. Fig. 4 plots the whole distribution of peak responses in financially stressed countries 
in the y -axis, versus the same distribution of the remaining countries in the x -axis, joint with a 45  degrees line. Each point 
in the graph represents the effects of a single draw, and for comparing across draws we rescale responses so that the UMP 
shock implies an increase of the ECB balance sheet by one percent in each draw. Two results emerge. First, output in finan- 
cially stressed countries increases less than what is observed in the rest of the euro area members. The bulk of points scatter 
below the 45  degrees line (about 87% of the draws), which suggests relatively smaller effects of UMP shocks in financially 
9 The ordering of the countries in terms of magnitude is mostly preserved. The correlation of median peak responses across the two models is about 
78% for prices, and 90% for output. 
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In particular, Baltic countries reported the highest variations in terms of prices and output; 
more specifically, Estonia demonstrated the greatest increase in prices and output. This is il-
lustrated on the right side of both figures, which present the ascending median peak responses 
for each country. For example, concerning price levels, Estonia recorded the highest increase 
(about 8 basis points), followed by Latvia, Spain and Greece (Figure 23); the effect, instead, 
is smaller in Germany (almost 3 basis points), and other countries such as France and Italy 
were scarcely significant. The effects on output are small or not statistically significant in the 
countries recently affected by the sovereign debt crisis, so, in the cases of Portugal, Greece 
and Spain.  
Both previous figures illustrate the heterogeneity among European countries. The study by 
Burriel et al. (2017) not only explains this difference but also estimates the evolution of this 
heterogeneity. To assess changes from over the years, they estimated the model for four dis-
tinct periods, each one larger than the previous by 3 years. As such, the first period spans Jan-
uary 2001 to December 2006; the second period contains the first but also includes the begin-
ning of the Great Recession, so it spans January 2001 to December 2009; the third period in-
cludes the implementation of the UMP by the ECB at the early stage of the sovereign debt 
crisis, so it spans  January 2001 to December 2012;, the final periods envelops Europe’s re-
sponse to the crisis, so it covers January 2001 to September 2015. 
Figure 24 shows the distinction between the four periods to demonstrate the effects of the 
UMP, in particular, the increased amount of the balance sheet which produced stronger results 
at the outset of the sovereign debt crisis from the moment of its effective implementation; in 
addition, the effects on prices and outputs present similar trends. In fact, pricing and output 
levels both increased during the sovereign debt crisis in 2012, and both decreased in the final 
phase of the 2001–2015 period.  
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Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
These effects are minor and not statistically significant during the first period, but they signif-
icantly increase and become statistically significant mainly in the third period; in the final pe-
riod, which includes the full sample, the effect slightly diminishes but remains statistically 
significant compared to the first and second periods. 
A further element which allows the identification of the heterogeneity among the countries is 
the different standard deviations recorded during the periods. Standard deviations for the first 
and second periods were similar, so the average effects for these countries were almost equal 
in terms of prices and output. In particular, it was 0.008% for output and 0.006% for prices. 
The divergence occurs during the sovereign debt crisis; during this period, heterogeneity 
reached its peak, with a standard deviation of 0.058% for output and 0.033% for prices. Thus, 







































































Fig. 3. Cross-country effects of UMP shocks over time. Notes: Figures display the median peak responses of output and prices to a one-standard-deviation 
UMP shock, joint with the 16th and 84th percentiles. 20 01–20 06, 20 01–20 09, 20 01–2012 , and 2001–2015  refer to the model estimated over the samples 
2001:01–2006:12, 2001:01–2009:12, 2001:01–2012:12, and 2001:01–2015:09, respectively. 
Table 2  
Cross-country effects of UMP shocks over time: descriptive statistics. 
Output Prices 
Mean Min Max Std. dev. Mean Min Max Std. dev. 
Benchmark 0.054 0.005 0.158 0.044 0.037 0.016 0.079 0.016 
20 01–20 06 0.014 0.003 0.029 0.008 0.005 −0.008 0.018 0.006 
20 01–20 09 0.037 0.018 0.077 0.016 0.023 0.010 0.058 0.014 
2001–2012 0.091 −0.010 0.225 0.058 0.052 0.003 0.126 0.033 
2001–2015 0.069 −0.011 0.170 0.044 0.048 0.004 0.126 0.029 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of median peak responses of output and prices to a one-standard-deviation 
UMP shock. Statistics are computed across countries ( N = 19 ), figures are in percent. Benchmark, 2001–
20 06, 20 01–20 09, 20 01–2012 , and 20 01–2015  refer to the model estimated over the samples 2007:01–
2015:09, 2001:01–2006:12, 2001:01–2009:12, 2001:01–2012:12, and 2001:01–2015:09, respecti ely. 
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in Europe, following the implementation of the UMP by the ECB, different countries record-
ed different effects in terms of prices and outputs, and, in particular, the differences among 
countries were greater in terms of output in relation to price. Table 3 reports the data just ana-
lysed.   
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the cross-country effects of UMP shocks over time 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
In addition to the previous analysis, the study also compares the effects on prices and outputs 
distinguishing those countries financially distressed, which were the PIIGS plus Cyprus. It 
was determined that the average output increased by 8 basis points in the stressed countries 
and 16 basis points in non-stressed countries; pricing levels increased, on average, by 9 basis 
points for stressed countries and 7 basis points for non-stressed countries.  
This study shows that the UMP has produced a larger gain in countries which have not been 
affected by the sovereign debt crisis. In fact, the stressed countries experienced less signifi-
cant increases in output with respect to the financially stable European countries. This has not 
encouraged the economic recovery of the PIIGS. 
 
3.3 The role of cross-country spillovers 
 
Burriel et al. (2017) evaluated why the UMP produced these shocks in very heterogeneous 
ways among the European countries. The first element analysed in the study are the cross-
country interactions which caused asymmetric transmission via spillover effects. As such, the 
following figure compares the direct effects on the prices and outputs for every country with 
those originated by the cross-country interactions. 
 







































































Fig. 3. Cross-country effects of UMP shocks over time. Notes: Figures display the median peak responses of output and prices to a one-standard-deviation 
UMP shock, joint with the 16th and 84th percentiles. 20 01–20 06, 20 01–20 09, 20 01–2012 , and 2001–2015  refer to the model estimated over the samples 
2001:01–2006:12, 2001:01–2009:12, 2001:01–2012:12, and 2001:01–2015:09, respectively. 
Table 2  
Cross-country effects of UMP shocks over time: descriptive statistics. 
Output Prices 
Mean Min Max Std. dev. Mean Min Max Std. dev. 
Benchmark 0.054 0.005 0.158 0.044 0.037 0.016 0.079 0.016 
20 01–20 06 0.014 0.003 0.029 0.008 0.005 −0.008 0.018 0.006 
20 01–20 09 0.037 0.018 0.077 0.016 0.023 0.010 0.058 0.014 
2001–2012 0.091 −0.010 0.225 0.058 0.052 0.003 0.126 0.033 
2001–2015 0.069 −0.011 0.170 0.044 0.048 0.004 0.126 0.029 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of median peak responses of output and prices to a one-standard-deviation 
UMP shock. Statistics are computed across countries ( N = 19 ), figures are in percent. Benchmark, 2001–
20 06, 20 01–20 09, 20 01–2012 , and 20 01–2015  refer to the model estimated over the samples 2007:01–
2015:09, 2001:01–2006:12, 2001:01–2009:12, 2001:01–2012:12, and 2001:01–2015:09, respectively. 
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Figure  25: Direct and spillover effects of UMP shocks on output and prices 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
Figure  25 shows two main results which emerged in such a comparison. The first is that 
spillover drastically amplifies the effects of UMP shocks; the second is that a substantial part 
of the heterogeneity in the effects can be attributed to the spillover within European countries. 
In accordance with the first previous result, the average peak output without spillover approx-
imates 2 basis points; when considering spillover, effects are more than double, as they equal 
5 basis points. A similar situation occurs  with prices; the average peak responses are 2 basis 
points and 4 basis points, without and with spillover, respectively. 
Concerning the second outcome, the figure shows that the substantial heterogeneity among 
the European countries in terms of output levels and in terms of pricing levels following the 
implementation of UMP is due in large measure to the presence of spillover. In particular, in 
the absence of cross-country interactions, the effects on output varies from 0 basis points to 6 
basis points, while the effects on prices lies between 0 basis points and 3 basis points; spillo-
ver between countries should be considered. Instead, the effects largely increase, in particular 
from 2 basis points to 8 basis points and from 0 basis points to 16 basis points, respectively, 
for the range of responses of prices and output. 
The results show an important consideration which is further supported by another study, 
which was conducted by Beneckà, Fadejeva and Feldkircher (2018), where, in particular, both 
studies show the importance of accounting for cross-country interdependencies when as-
sessing the transmission of monetary policies both conventional and unconventional across 
the EU. Overlooking spillover in the EU would substantially underestimate the effects of 
UMP shocks (Burriel et al. 2017). 
220 P. Burriel, A. Galesi / European Ec nomic Review 101 (2018) 210–229  
















































Fig. 5. Direct and spillover effects of UMP shocks. Notes: Figures display the median peak responses of output and prices to a one-standard-deviation UMP 
shock. Dark blue bars refer to the direct effects, obtained with the model without cross-country linkages; light blue bars refer to spillovers, obtained as 
difference between the effects of the model with linkages and the direct effects. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
We then investigate which structural features of the economy may be good predictors of this heterogeneity. To this 
end, we regress the estimated effects over a set of country-specific variables. First, we consider real GDP per capita as a 
proxy for the level of economic development of a country. The effects of UMP shocks may be different depending on the 
development of an economy through a variety of mechanisms. For instance, as countries develop, they shift resources from 
manufacturing to services, thus changing the sectoral composition of the economy. In the context of conventional monetary 
policy, the industry structure of a country may affect the transmission of monetary policy because sectors react differently 
to changes in the policy rate (e.g. Galesi and Rachedi, 2016; Georgiadis, 2015a ). 
Second, we include an index of soundness of the banking sector, which is proxied by the share of capital in total assets 
held by banks. The degree of soundness of countries’ banking systems may have important implications for the effectiveness 
of ECB’s non-standard policies, due to the specific nature of these measures. Indeed, expansionary policies should benefit 
banks’ balance sheets, but these stimuli may not necessarily translate into additional lending if banks need to reestablish 
the solidity of their balance sheets. In this respect, a weak banking system may limit the effectiveness of UMP shocks, as it 
has already been shown in Boeckx et al. (2017) . 
Third, we consider the level of unemployment as a proxy for various factors such as aggregate demand conditions and 
labor market frictions. Expansionary UMP shocks may have a limited effect on consumption, employment, and economic 
activity, if households are borrowing constrained and thus, their demand is limited by current income. Similarly, frictions in 
the labor market like strict employment protection regulations, are expected to dampen the effectiveness of unconventional 
monetary policies by limiting job creation. 
Finally, we add an index of ease of doing business developed by the World Bank. Values of this index lie in between 
between zero and one hundred, where a low level means that the regulatory environment is less conducive to the starting 
and operation of a firm. The index aggregates several indicators such as getting credit, enforcing contracts, or resolving 
insolvency, and we use it as a proxy for all those frictions and barriers which may impede the creation of new firms. 
A preliminary inspection of the data shows that there is substantial correlation between the effects of UMP shocks and 
some country-specific characteristics. Fig. 6 plots the peak responses of output against country-specific features under study. 
Less developed countries, as measured by real GDP per capita, benefit more from UMP shocks. At the same time, higher 
effects are observed in those countries with a more resilient banking sector. This result suggests the existence of a potential 
bottleneck in the effectiveness of UMP shocks which works via the bank lending channel. The unemployment rate does 
not correlate with effects, while there is some evidence that countries with more favorable regulatory systems for firms’ 
operations are also those which experience the larger gains in real activity. 
Regarding the effects on prices, Fig. 7 shows that again, countries which are either at a lower stage of development, or 
feature a sounder banking system, experience larger beneficial effects from UMP shocks. Moreover, higher unemployment 
in some instances, even larger than the domestic effects. Im portantly, our model does not capture spillover and spillback effects between the euro area 
and the rest of the world. As shown in Georgiadis (2015b ), abstracting from such higher-order transmission channels may lead to underestimate spillovers. 
In this vein, our spillover estimates are conservative, in the sense that the relevance of spillovers could be amplified when accounting for interactions with 
the rest of the world. 
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3.4 The causes of QE heterogeneous effectiveness across EU countries 
 
The study then illustrates which structural features of the country’s economy accurately esti-
mate the heterogeneity of the effects on prices and outputs; the first feature analysed is the re-
al GDP per capita, considered a possible proxy of the economic development of a country. In 
fact, it is reasonable to assume that the effects of a UMP shock could vary due to differences 
between the  GDPs of the countries in question with respect to its potential value. In particu-
lar, if a country presents a GDPs level almost equal to its potential value, the effect of the 
UMP will be higher because the shock will entirely transfer into an increase in the level of 
prices. If a country presents a GDP which is lower with respect to its potential value, then the 
UMP can increase both the prices and the GDP dampening the increase of inflation levels. 
Figure 26 illustrates the correlation between the real GDP per capita and the effects of UMP 
shocks on both prices and outputs. 
 
Figure 26: Peak responses of prices or output and the country’s real GDP per capita 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
Figure 26 presents two negative correlations, which means that the effect on prices is higher 
in those countries that present a greater differential between the potential and the effective 
GDP. The same relationship is found for output, which reported more significant effects. 
The study also accounted for the soundness of the banking sector, which was determined us-
ing an index measuring the total assets constituting the capital which were held by banks. Ac-
cording to this, it could be relevant to consider the differences among the capitals held by the 
banks in the countries of the sample because, in general, the monetary stimulus implemented 
by the ECB has a positive effect on the balance sheets of the banks. For this reason, in theory, 
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Fig. 7. Peak responses of prices and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of prices to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
Table 3  
Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics. 
Output Prices 
Direct Spillover Total Direct Spillover Total 
effect effect effect effect effect effect 
Real GDP per capita −0.01 −0.04 ∗∗ −0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 ∗ −0.01 ∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Banks’ capital ratio 0.44 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Unemployment rate −0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 ∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Ease of doing business 0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant −0.02 0.23 ∗ 0.21 −0.01 0.07 0.06 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 19  19  19  19  19  19  
R 2 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.10 0.61 0.62 
Notes: Dependent variables are the median peak responses of output and prices to a one- 
standard-deviation UMP shock. Total effect refers to responses from the model with cross-country 
interactions, direct effect refers to responses from the model without cross-country interactions, 
and spillover effect is the difference between total and direct effects. Real GDP per capita is mea- 
sured in logs. Regressors are measured as averages over 2007–2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Fig. 6. Pe k responses of outpu  and country characteristics. Notes: Figur display the relationship between the median peak response of output to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and eco omies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
rate associates with higher effects on prices, while there is no clear relationship with regards to the ease of doing business 
index. 
Further, we regress the median peak responses of output and prices on the full set of country-specific characteristics. We 
also distinguish between direct and spillover effects, since the latter may also depend on the various specific features of each 
economy. Table 3  reports results. Regarding output, regressions confirm the result that less developed countries, as measured 
by real GDP per capita, benefit more from UMP shocks. Interestingly, this relationship arises due to spillover effects, which 
suggests that less developed economies mostly gain from developments abroad. At the same time, UMP shocks imply output 
effects which are larger in those countries with a more resilient banking sector, and this relationship is strengthened by the 
presence of spillover effects. We observe a similar relationship regarding prices, but in this case just via spillover effects. 
In this respect, in the case of prices we find that the estimated coefficients attached to the banks’ capital ratio are smaller 
than those obtained when we use the output effects as dependent variable. This result suggests that countries with more 
fragile banking systems benefit relatively less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. Finally 
we find mild evidence that less developed countries, as well as those with higher levels of unemployment rate, feature 
larger gains in prices. Interestingly, a model which abstracts from cross-country interactions would uncover just some of 
the relationships that we have documented. Hence, the international dimension of a country matters for determining the 
potential determinants of the heterogeneous transmission of UMP shocks. 
3.3. The i plications of heterogeneity for the euro area 
We have shown that the heterogeneity of effects across countries is substantial, and part of this dispersion can be ex- 
plained by few country-specific determinants. In particular, countries with more fragile banking systems benefit relatively 
less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. In the following, we investigate the implications of 
such heterogeneity for the effectiveness of UMP shocks for the whole currency union. 
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the increases on the balance sheets should translate into increased lending activity; however, 
if banks presented some financial problems, the huge injection of liquidity resulting from the 
UMP could incentivise them to resolve their financial problems and re-establish the solidity 
of their balance sheets, and so the lending activity (Burriel et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 27: Peak responses of prices or output and the country’s Bank capital and reserve to total assets  
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
Figure 27 shows positive correlations between the soundness of the banking sector and the ef-
fects on prices and outputs; this means that those countries which present sounder banking 
systems were more affected by the UMP shocks with respect to those countries with more 
fragile banking sectors. As such the effect is more noticeable when analysing the reaction in 
relation to output with respect to pricing levels. 
The third element taken in consideration by the study is the level of unemployment; this vari-
able is taken into account as an approximation of the level of the aggregate demand conditions 
and as an estimation of the labour market frictions for each country in the sample. In particu-
lar, constrained household borrowing limited demand according to the level of income, so 
possible increases to consumption, employment, and economic activity levels for the country 
were marginally affected by the expansionary UMP shocks. The same situation occurred 
when the labour market presented some frictions as strict employment protection regulation; 
in this case, the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary policies adopted by the ECB 
was mitigated because of these hard restrictions which limited the creation of jobs (Burriel et 
al., 2017). 
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Fig. 7. Peak responses of prices and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of prices to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
Table 3  
Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics. 
Output Prices 
Direct Spillover Total Direct Spillover Total 
effect effect effect effect effect effect 
Real GDP per capita −0.01 −0.04 ∗∗ −0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 ∗ −0.01 ∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Banks’ capital ratio 0.44 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Unemployment rate −0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 ∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Ease of doing business 0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant −0.02 0.23 ∗ 0.21 −0.01 0.07 0.06 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 19  19  19  19  19  19  
R 2 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.10 0.61 0.62 
Notes: Dependent variables are the median peak responses of output and prices to a one- 
standard-deviation UMP shock. Total effect refers to responses from the model with cross-country 
interactions, direct effect refers to responses from the model without cross-country interactions, 
and spillover effect is the difference between total and direct effects. Real GDP per capita is mea- 
sured in logs. Regressors are measured as averages over 2007–2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Fig. 6. Peak r sponses of output and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of output to a 
one-stand rd-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
rate associates with higher effects on prices, while there is no clear relationship with regards to the ease of doing business 
index. 
Further, we regress the median peak responses of output and prices on the full set of country-specific characteristics. We 
also distinguish between direct and spillover effects, since the latter may also depend on the various specific features of each 
conomy. Table 3  reports results. Reg rding output, regressions confirm the result that less developed countries, as measured 
by real GDP per capita, benefit more from UMP shocks. Interestingly, this relationship arises due to spillover effects, which 
suggests that less developed economies mostly gain from developments abroad. At the same time, UMP shocks imply output 
effects which are larger in those countries with a more resilient banking sector, and this relationship is strengthened by the 
presence of spillover effects. We observe a similar relationship regarding prices, but in this case just via spillover effects. 
In this respect, in the case of prices we find that the estimated coefficients attached to the banks’ capital ratio are smaller 
than those obtained when we use the output effects as dependent variable. This result suggests that countries with more 
fragile banking systems benefit relatively less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. Finally 
we find mild evidence that less developed countries, as well as those with higher levels of unemployment rate, feature 
larger gains in prices. Interestingly, a model which abstracts from cross-country interactions would uncover just some of 
the relationships that we have documented. Hence, the international dimension of a country matters for determining the 
potential determinants of the heterogeneous transmission of UMP shocks. 
3.3. The implications of heterogeneity for the euro area 
We have shown that the heterogeneity of effects across countries is substantial, and part of this dispersion can be ex- 
plained by few country-specific determinants. In particular, countries with more fragile banking systems benefit relatively 
less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. In the following, we investigate the implications of 
such heterogeneity for the effectiveness of UMP shocks for the whole currency union. 
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Figure 28: Peak responses of prices or output and the country’s unemployment rate (in %) 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
Figure 28 shows the correlation between unemployment rates and the median peak responses 
of prices and outputs after a UMP shock; the effects are more evident with prices. The coun-
tries with higher levels of unemployment were subject to stronger effects in terms of price in-
creases with respect to those countries with higher levels of employment. Concerning the lev-
el of output, it seems that the countries with very high levels of unemployment presented very 
small effects on the output after the UMP shock; the correlation is low likely due to a signifi-
cant difference between the countries in the sample. In fact, the scatter plot shows a large 
number of outliers which could distort and smooth the correlation. 
The final variable analysed was an index developed by World Bank which illustrates the ease 
of doing business in the countries considered; in particular, its value goes from 0 to 100, 
where the maximum value (100) describes a regulatory environment ideal to starting and con-
ducting a new firm. 
 
Figure 29: Peak responses of prices or output and the country’s ease of doing business index 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
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Fig. 7. Peak responses of prices and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of prices to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
Table 3  
Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics. 
Output Prices 
Direct Spillover Total Direct Spillover Total 
effect effect effect effect effect effect 
Real GDP per capita −0.01 −0.04 ∗∗ −0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 ∗ −0.01 ∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Banks’ capital ratio 0.44 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Unemployment rate −0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 ∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Ease of doing business 0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant −0.02 0.23 ∗ 0.21 −0.01 0.07 0.06 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 19  19  19  19  19  19  
R 2 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.10 0.61 0.62 
Notes: Dependent variables are the median peak responses of output and prices to a one- 
standard-deviation UMP shock. Total effect refers to responses from the model with cross-country 
interactions, direct effect refers to responses from the model without cross-country interactions, 
and spillover effect is the difference between total and direct effects. Real GDP per capita is mea- 
sured in logs. Regressors are measured as av rages over 2007–2013. Robus  standard rrors in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Fig. 6. Peak responses of outpu  and country characteristics. Notes: Figur display the relationship between the median peak response of output to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and eco omies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
rate associates with higher effects on prices, while there is no clear relationship with regards to the ease of doing business 
index. 
Further, we regress the median peak responses of output and prices on the full set of country-specific characteristics. We 
also distinguish between direct a d spillover effects, sinc  the latter may also depend on the various specific features of each 
conomy. Table 3  reports results. Regarding output, regressions confirm the result that less developed countries, as measured 
by real GDP per capita, benefit more from UMP sh cks. Interestingly, this relationship arises due to spillover effects, which 
suggests that less developed economies mostly gain from developments abroad. At the same time, UMP shocks imply output 
effects which are larg r in those countries with a more resilient banking sector, and this relationship is strengthened by the 
presence of spillover effects. We observe a similar relationship regarding prices, but in this case just via spillover effects. 
In this respect, in the case of prices we find that the estimated coefficients attached to the banks’ capital ratio are smaller 
than those obtained when we use the output effects as dependent variable. This result suggests that countries with more 
fragile banking systems benefit relatively less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. Finally 
we find mild evidence that less developed countries, as well as those with higher levels of unemployment rate, feature 
larger gains in prices. Interestingly, a model which abstracts from cross-country interactions would uncover just some of 
the relationships that we have documented. Hence, the international dimension of a country matters for determining the 
potential determinants of the heterogeneous transmission of UMP shocks. 
3.3. The implications of heterogeneity for the e ro area 
We have shown that the heterogeneity of effects across countries is substantial, and part of this dispersion can be ex- 
plained by few country-specific determinants. In particular, countries with more fragile banking systems benefit relatively 
less from UMP shock, a d especially so in terms of re l activity gains. In the following, we investigate the implications of 
such heterogeneity for the effectiveness of UMP shocks for the whole currency union. 
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Fig. 7. Peak responses of prices and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of prices to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
Table 3  
Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics. 
Output Prices 
Direct Spillover Total Direct Spillover Total 
effect effect effect effect effect effect 
Real GDP per capita −0.01 −0.04 ∗∗ −0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 ∗ −0.01 ∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Banks’ capital ratio 0.44 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Unemployment rate −0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 ∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Ease of doing business 0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant −0.02 0.23 ∗ 0.21 −0.01 0.07 0.06 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 19  19  19  19  19  19  
R 2 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.10 0.61 0.62 
Notes: Dependent variables are the median peak responses of output and prices to a one- 
standard-deviation UMP shock. Total effect refers to responses from the model with cross-country 
interactions, direct effect refers to responses from the model without cross-country interactions, 
and spillover effect is the difference between total and direct effects. Real GDP per capita is mea- 
sured in logs. Regressors are measured as averages over 2007–2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Fig. 6. Peak responses of output and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of output to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
rate associates with higher effects on prices, while there is no clear relationship with regards to the ease of doing business 
index. 
Further, we regress the median peak responses of output and prices on the full set of country-specific characteristics. We 
also distinguish between direct and spillover effects, since the latter may also depend on the various specific features of each 
economy. Table 3  repor s resu ts. Regarding output, regressions confirm the result that less developed countries, as measured 
by real GDP per capita, benefit more from UMP shocks. Interestingly, this relationship arises due to spillover effects, which 
suggests that less developed economies mostly gain from developments abroad. At the same time, UMP shocks imply output 
effects which are larger in those countries with a more resilient banking sector, and this relationship is strengthened by the 
presence of spillover effects. We observe a similar relationship regarding prices, but in this case just via spillover effects. 
In this respect, in the case of prices we find that the estimated coefficients attached to the banks’ capital ratio are smaller 
than those obtained when we use the output effects as dependent variable. This result suggests that countries with more 
fragile banking systems benefit relatively less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. Finally 
we find mild evidence that less developed countries, as well as those with higher levels of unemployment rate, feature 
larger gains in prices. Interestingly, a model which abstracts from cross-country interactions would uncover just some of 
the relationships that we have documented. Hence, the international dimension of a country matters for determining the 
potential determinants of the heterogeneous transmission of UMP shocks. 
3.3. The implications of heterogeneity for the euro area 
We ha shown that the heterog neity of effects across countries is substantial, and part of this dispersion can be ex- 
plained by few country-specific determinants. In particular, countries with more fragile banking systems benefit relatively 
less from UMP shock, and especially so in terms of real activity gains. In the following, we investigate the implications of 
such heterogeneity for the effectiveness of UMP shocks for the whole currency union. 
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Figure 29 shows the relationship between the median peak responses of prices and outputs af-
ter an UMP shock; in particular, the effects on prices were not clear. In fact, the high disper-
sion of countries smoothes the relationship between the index and the adoption of the extraor-
dinary monetary measures. Output evidently displayed positive and relatively high correla-
tions; this means that the countries which were easier to do business with recorded higher ef-
fects in terms of output after the implementation of the UMP by the ECB (Burriel et al., 
2017).  
Table 4 presents the structural characteristics of the economy, which have been previously 
explained, which are analysed by distinguishing direct from spillover effects.  
 
Table 4: Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics 
 
Source: Burriel and Galesi (2017). 
 
The table shows that less-developed countries benefitted more in terms of output from the 
UMP shocks; it is interesting that this relationship arises from spillover effects. The same sit-
uation happens when analysing prices and banks’ capital ratios; according to this, countries 
with more fragile banking systems benefit relatively less than other countries, which mainly 
results from spillover. 
The table shows that the country’s international dimension is relevant and matters at the mo-
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Fig. 7. Peak responses of prices and country characteristics. Notes: Figures display the relationship between the median peak response of prices to a 
one-standard-deviation UMP shock and economies’ structural characteristics. The black line depicts the regression line. 
Table 3  
Effects of UMP shocks and country characteristics. 
Output Prices 
Direct Spillover Total Direct Spillover Total 
effect effect effect effect effect effect 
Real GDP per capita −0.01 −0.04 ∗∗ −0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 ∗ −0.01 ∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Banks’ capital ratio 0.44 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Unemployment rate −0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 ∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Ease of doing business 0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant −0.02 0.23 ∗ 0.21 −0.01 0.07 0.06 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 19  19  19  19  19  19  
R 2 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.10 0.61 0.62 
Notes: Dependent variables are the median peak responses of output and prices to a one- 
standard-deviation UMP shock. Total effect refers to responses from the model with cross-country 
interactions, direct effect refers to responses from the model without cross-country interactions, 
and spillover effect is the difference between total and direct effects. Real GDP per capita is mea- 
sured in logs. Regressors are measured as averages over 2007–2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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3.5 The New Keynesian interpretation of QE effectiveness 
 
The Phillips Curve forms the basis of numerous models, most of which are called New 
Keynesian Models, which start from this relationship and introduce some microeconomic var-
iables, as the price stickiness and the degree of backwardness, to try to explain variations in 
inflation.  
As such, we will now illustrate the model proposed by Galì and Gertler (1999) and Galì et al. 
(2001); the model used by Galì et al. (1999) presents three distinctive features with respect to 
the traditional Phillips Curve. The first regards the analysed variable; in particular, the model 
uses the real marginal cost in place of the output gap (or the unemployment level) since, ac-
cording to the New Keynesians, it directly accounts for the effects of the productivity gains on 
inflation; second, a subset of firms are allowed to set their prices according to a backward 
looking rule, so, in this way, they try to estimate the inflation persistence by comparing with a 
pure forward-looking model. The final feature regards the structural parameters of the model. 
In particular, they analysed the degree of price ‘stickiness’ so the average duration that a price 
remains fixed, and the degree of ‘backwardness’, so the fraction of firms that use as rule of 
thumb the backward-looking rule.         
They assumed an environment constituted by a set of monopolistically competitive firms 
which face some type of constraints on price adjustments. The most common form of such a 
constraint is the time; in other words, the price adjustment rule, for the set of firms, is time-
dependent. This means that for every period, it is possible to distinguish a fraction of firms 
!
!
 which set their prices for 𝑋 periods. Taylor already introduced the latter scenario in 1980, 
but the key difference is that, in the model proposed by Galì et al. (1999), the pricing decision 
evolves explicitly from a monopolistic competitor’s profit maximization problem, subject to 
the constraint of time-dependent price adjustments. However, in order to simplify the model 
and resolve the aggregation problem, Galì et al. (1999) decided to employ the Calvo assump-
tion (1983). 
As such, the model proposed by Galì et al. (1999) assumes that each firm is able to adjust its 
prices in any given period with a fixed probability 1− 𝜃  which is independent of the time 
that the price has been fixed. The study departs from Calvo’s assumption by introducing the 
coexistence of two types of firms, in particular, a fraction 1− 𝜔  of firms called “forward 
looking” which set optimal prices using all available information in order to forecast the fu-
ture marginal costs; the remaining firms 𝜔  are called “backward looking” and instead use 
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the recent history of the aggregate price behaviour as a rule of thumb when defining their 
prices. The following equation describes this environment: 
 
𝑝! = 𝜃𝑝!!! + 1− 𝜃 𝑝!∗ 
 
In particular, by defining as 𝑝!
! the price set by the forward looking firms at time 𝑡 and 𝑝!! as 
the price set by the backward looking firms at time 𝑡, it is possible to explain the optimal price 
with the subsequent equation 
 
𝑝!∗ = 1− 𝜔 𝑝!
! + 𝜔𝑝!! 
 
in which the forward looking firms behave in an optimal way because they take into consider-
ation all the available information in order to forecast the future value of the marginal cost. In 
fact, by denoting 𝑚𝑐!!  as the firm’s nominal marginal cost at 𝑡 and 𝛽 as a subjective dis-
count factor, then a firm which chooses the price at 𝑡 will maximise the expected discounted 
profits subject to the time-dependent pricing rule. The optimal reset price for the forward 
looking firms may be formulated as follows: 
𝑝!





The model illustrated by Galì et al. (1999) explains the main variables that have been investi-
gated by Schäfer (2018) in a comparison of the European countries. In particular, he used this 
New Keynesian model as the basis for his estimations (Schäfer, 2018): 
 
𝜋! = 𝜆𝑚𝑐! + 𝛾!𝐸! 𝜋!!! + 𝛾!𝜋!!! 
 
According to this, he analysed the price stickiness 𝜃  and the degree of backwardness 𝜔  of 
six European countries, Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, during 
three distinct periods, in particular, during the pre-crisis period from January 1999 to July 
2007, in the crisis period from August 2007 to August 2012 and during the “Whatever It 
Takes” period (WIT) from September 2012 to June 2016. 




Table 5: Variables analysed in the study 
Variable Description 
(1− 𝜃) Probability that firms change their prices 
(1− 𝜔) Amount of firms that change their price optimally 
Source: Schäfer (2018). 
 
The study uses the GDP Deflator annualised rate as a measure to illustrate the variation in 
term of prices, according to this, the Table 6 summarizes the results recorded in each Europe-
an state of the sample. 
 
o Austria 
Table 6 allows us to see that in this country the price stickiness 𝜃 increased during the period 
of the crisis and decreased in the period following the crisis, which means that during the 
stressed period, the probability that the Austrian firms changed their prices was very low. In 
other words, they were less able to change their prices compared with the situation post-crisis. 
Regarding the degree of backwardness 𝜔, it declined during the crisis; this means that, unex-
pectedly, in the stressed period there was a larger number of firms which changed their prices 
optimally and a lower number of firms which easily changed their prices using as rule of 
thumb the price from the period before. This is unexpected because, in theory, during a period 
of crisis, the firms should be more inclined to adopt the price of the period before, as the fu-
ture is more uncertain, so, in theory, 𝜔 should increase. Since 𝜔 increased again after 2012, a 
possible interpretation would be that the crisis somehow decreased marginal cost uncertainty 
in Austria, while the ECB’s reaction after 2012 increased this uncertainty again. During the 
crisis period, in fact, the firms were more confident of the future development of the marginal 
cost and so were better able to implement the optimal price with respect to the period charac-









Table 6: Summary of the results recorded in the each country 
Dependent Var. 
GDP Deflator (annualised rate of change) 





















































































Source: Schäfer (2018). 
 
o Germany  
The Table 6 illustrates  price stickiness and the degree of backwardness in the case of Germa-
ny. In particular, it is possible to see that the value of 𝜃 decreased more during the three dis-
tinct periods. This means that the probability that German firms could change their prices al-
ways increased. Instead, concerning 𝜔, it increased during the three distinct periods. This im-
plies that a lower number of firms during the years always set their price optimally, so they 






o Spain  
In the case of Spain, it is possible to see that the price stickiness 𝜃 increased during the crisis 
period (Table 6) in fact, it reached almost one. This means that during the financially stressed 
period, Spanish firms were less able to change their prices. In other words, the probability that 
they could change their prices was almost 0%; however, this probability increased again dur-
ing the WIT period. However, the degree of backwardness, 𝜔, decreased during the crisis pe-
riod and further dropped following the WIT speech. This means that Spanish firms greatly an-
ticipated the disinflation trend of the crisis and successfully stabilised their prices following 
the financial troubles. In fact, a decreasing value of 𝜔 implied a larger number of firms which 
set their prices optimally and a lower number of firms which easily fixed their prices accord-
ing to the period before (Schäfer, 2018). 
 
o France 
Looking at the values for price stickiness and the degree of backwardness for France, it is 
possible to see that the trends oppose those recorded in Austria and in Spain. In particular, 
Table 6 shows that price stickiness decreased during the crisis period and increased in the fol-
lowing period. This means that the probability 𝜃 that French firms could change their prices 
was very high during the financial crisis and decreased after 2012. Instead, the degree of 
backwardness, 𝜔, increased during the crisis period and diminished during the following one. 
This perfectly aligns with the common theory; in fact, during the crisis period, the number of 
firms which set their prices optimally should have decreased due to the greater uncertainty 
surrounding the future, so prices should equal those from the period before; instead, after the 
crisis, the number of firms which set their prices optimally should increase because the crisis 
situation has passed: it would be resolved and there would be less uncertainty surrounding the 
future (Schäfer, 2018).     
 
o Italy 
The effects in Italy regarding price stickiness and the degree of backwardness are similar to 
those recorded in France. In particular, as the Table 6 shows, the probability 1− 𝜃  that a 
firm could change its prices increased during the crisis period, likely due to the disinflation 
pressures, and decreased after 2012, probably due to the stabilisation of inflation expectations. 
The degree of backwardness, 𝜔, increased during the crisis period and decreased in the fol-
lowing one. This, again, aligns with the common theory that during the financially distressed 
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period, the number of firms which set their prices optimally should decrease, and, instead, 
should increase during economically stable phases (Schäfer, 2018). 
 
o Netherlands 
As is possible to see from the Table 6 the price stickiness in the case of the Netherlands de-
creased during the crisis period and increased after 2012. This means that the probability that 
Dutch firms could change their prices strongly decreased between the crisis period and the 
following WIT period. Instead, the degree of backwardness, 𝜔, always decreased more during 
the three distinct periods of time. This implies that a larger number of Dutch firms were al-
ways forward-looking when setting their prices and that they optimally anticipated the mar-
ginal cost variation throughout the years (Schäfer, 2018).  
 
This study has demonstrated that some results perfectly align with the common theory, as is 
the case for the French and the Italian changes in the degree of backwardness over the years, 
while others do not align, as with Austria’s degree of backwardness during the crisis period. 
However, the results highlighted that the Great Recession and the UMP had, and probably 
still have, a profound impact on the dynamic of the European inflation. In fact, most results 
recorded in the third period are largely different from those recorded in the first one. This 
means that the crisis and the subsequent ECB reactions have permanently changed the coun-
tries’ inflation dynamics. Moreover, the study shows that the crisis of 2009 and the following 
countermeasures adopted by the ECB have affected in very different ways the European 
member states in terms of both price stickiness and degree of backwardness, demonstrating 
again the huge heterogeneity among EU countries. This implies the need for cautious mone-
tary policy and, furthermore, an actual low level of economic convergence among the Euro-
pean member states. 
 
3.6 The role of the money multiplier on the inflation level  
 
As explained in the previous paragraphs, different levels of inflation exist among European 
countries. Moreover, some possible factors have already been illustrated that determine such 
different values between the European member states. Accordingly, despite the implementa-
tion of a common monetary policy by the ECB, this policy does not translate into an equal in-
crease in real money throughout all European countries. Consequently, we will try to explain 
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why there has not been an equal monetary increase among the European countries despite the 
implementation of the QE. To do so, we have analysed the M1 and M3 growth rates for each 
European country and the role of the money multiplier on the inflation level.  
The underlying idea of the monetary policy’s transmission process is that by changing the 
monetary base, the central banks can affect the quantity of money present in the system. 
However, they are not able to perfectly control the whole quantity of money. In fact, an in-
crease in the monetary base can lead to an increase in the money stock, but the effect depends 
on the willingness of the commercial banks to utilise the excess reserve to extend the credit, 
and, in addition, it depends on the individuals’ preferences to hold cash rather than deposits.   
The money multiplier is an important variable in the analysis of the inflation level; in particu-
lar, studies show that a decrease in the money multiplier coincides with a decrease in the level 
of inflation. The money multiplier is equal to the ratio between the broad money and the 
monetary base, and it strongly influences the bank activity. In particular, the higher the value 
of the money multiplier, the higher will be the amount of liquidity that the banks can create. 
This ratio is influenced by two main variables: the reserve ratio and the currency ratio. The re-
serve ratio 𝑟𝑟  is equal to the amount of reserves over deposits, while the currency ratio 𝑐𝑟  
is the quantity of currency over the deposits. The money multiplier and the monetary base in-




𝑐𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟 ∗𝑀𝐵 
 
Figure 30 shows that the money multiplier decreased dramatically since the beginning of the 
global financial crisis in the third quarter of 2008 in all three major currency areas.  
 
Figure 30: Money multiplier in the US, Euro Area and Japan, 2002-2014 
 
Source: Dabrowski (2016). 
15
Figure 1: Money multiplier in the US, Euro area and Japan, 2002–2014  
(broad money/base money)
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (www.data.imf.org)  
and author’s own calculation
In countries which suffer from the limited credibility of their currencies, the demand 
for money balances denominated in the local currency also collapses as a result of financial 
crisis (because of the flight to foreign currency) which will be reflected in increasing mon-
ey velocity. In such cases, the room for maneuver of the central bank to provide emergency 
liquidity to local banks and compensate for the decreasing money multiplier remains 
limited. However, in advanced economies, this is rarely a problem. On the contrary, a financial 
crisis usually results in increasing demand for (the decreasing velocity of) base money and 
narrow money (M1).
The recent global financial crisis, which was triggered by the bust of the subprime 
mortgage market in the US in the summer of 2007, provided good empirical evidence 

















There are numerous factors that contributed to this decline. For example, in periods of crisis, 
the values of the currency ratio and the reserve ratio both tend to increase, resulting in a de-
crease in the money multiplier. In fact, the common behaviour of individuals during a period 
of crisis is reduced trust in the banking system, so, as a consequence, they prefer to hold cur-
rency instead of bank deposits, reducing the money available in the banking system. Accord-
ingly, the value of the currency ratio (𝑐𝑟) tends to increase in economically stressed periods.  
On the other side, from the bank’s point of view, in a situation of crisis the bankers usually 
increase the amount of reserves, adopting a more ‘conservative’ business model. In fact, 
bankers are often scared about a possible bank run by individuals, and so they increase the ex-
cess reserve in order to have enough liquidity to satisfy the possible requests. As a conse-
quence, the value of the reserve ratio (𝑟𝑟) increases. Figure 31 perfectly illustrates the varia-
tion of the reserve ratio in the case of the Euro Area (EA) and the US. For both regions, the 
value of the reserve ratio 𝑟𝑟  strongly increased after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse (the 
first vertical red line), even if the effect is larger in the US than in Europe. Regarding Europe, 
the amount of the 𝑟𝑟  increased even after the bill’s announcement of the Greek Prime Min-
ister Papandreou (the second vertical red line) in 2010. 
 
Figure 31: Total Reserves as a Share of Total Banking Credit in the EA and in the US 
 
Source: Cukierman (2014). 
 
A comparison between the money multipliers of the main European countries evinces a com-
mon trend among the states. In particular, Figure 32 illustrates the reduction of the money 
multiplier over the years and the differences in terms of values. In 2018, the highest value is 
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reached by the Netherlands, while Spain and Italy present the lowest values. Taking a Euro-
pean-wide perspective, it is possible to see that in the EA in general, there is a decreasing 
trend in the money multiplier over the last 10 years, and the Sovereign Debt crisis in 2012 
created a further crease in it.  
 
Figure 32: The money multiplier for selected countries, 2008-2018 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Trading Economics data. 
 
The regulatory environment has an effect on the final value of the money multiplier. In par-
ticular, tighter regulations, like an increase in the values of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
or in the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), will inevitably disincentive the banks to borrow 
money. Also, the monetary instrument of the mandatory reserve requirements (MMR), al-
ready explained in the first chapter, determines a reduction in the money multiplier. Hence, 
some central banks of economically advanced countries, like the Bank of England (BOE), 
have de facto abandoned this instrument for the last two decades. 
Surprisingly, another possible element that has determined a decrease in the money multiplier 
is the unconventional monetary policy. This factor finds more empirical than theoretical evi-
dence. In fact, most of the time, periods of decline in the money multiplier and of increases in 
commercial banks deposits in central banks coincide with the phases of the QE. In support of 
this, the interval in the US (second half of 2013) characterized by a reduction in asset pur-
chases and the time in Europe between 2012-2013 when the ECB temporarily stopped the un-
conventional monetary measures (Figure 33) coincide with periods when, respectively, the 
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Figure 33: Central bank liabilities to other depository corporations in the US, EA and Japan, 2002-
2016 
 
Source: Dabrowski (2018). 
 
The hypothesis supposed by this study is that: ‘Probably, QE has absorbed so many low-risk 
liquid securities from the financial market that commercial banks have had to increase their 
voluntary deposits in central banks to manage their liquidity’ (Dabrowski, 2018). This means 
that if the hypothesis is correct, the main instrument used by the ECB to increase the money 
supply has, in reality, produced the opposite effect.     
The fluctuation of the money multiplier can be explained to some extent by the trend of two 
monetary aggregates, M3 and M1, which in turn affect the level of inflation. Hence, it may be 
interesting to analyse the growth rates of the monetary aggregates of the main European coun-





Such conservative behaviour can explain the phenomenon of the large excess voluntary reserves kept by 
commercial banks in central banks (Figure 15) regardless they are subject of positive (US Fed) or negative interest 
rate (ECB). In monetary policy terms, this means a lower money multiplier as compared to when banks work at full 
lending capacity (i.e. withi  the limits s t by regulatory norms). 
Figure 15: Central bank liabilities to other depository corporations, the US, EA, and 
Japan, 2002-2016 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (www.data.imf.org) and author’s own calculation  
The third factor that could dampen the money multiplier is unconventional monetary policy and the various central 
bank interventions on financial markets. For example, providing additional lending opportunities to commercial 
banks and accepting their deposits on a mass scale did not help in rebuilding the interbank market.  
Furthermore, Figures 13, 14 and 15 suggest that periods of rapid declines in the money multiplier and rapid 
increases in commercial bank deposits in central banks coincided with periods of quantitative easing (QE)5, while 
stopping or slowing down direct asset purchases by central banks (e.g. by the Fed since the second half of 2013 and 
the ECB in 2012-2013) stabilised or even somewhat increased the money multiplier (and decreased banks deposits 
with central banks). Probably, QE has absorbed so many low-risk liquid securities from the financial market that 
commercial banks have had to increase their voluntary deposits in central banks to manage their liquidity. If this 
hypothesis is correct, it can mean a sort of vicious circle where the instrument aimed at increasing the money 
supply has the opposite effect.  
Overall, in the crisis and post-crisis period, the decline in the money multiplier has been a powerful deflationary 
factor in the three analysed AEs. This single factor is sufficient to explain the continuous low inflation environment 
in which these economies operate. However, it is unlikely to expect a further decline in the money multipli r in the 
coming years. Rather, as result of the gradual normalisation of monetary policy and the revival of financial 
i termediation (once banks fully adjust to a n w regulatory e vironment), it can start to increase, as al eady 
observed in the US. Furthermore, one cannot exclude that the successful pressure of the financial lobby, especially 
in the US, can lead to a partial relaxation of the post-crisis regulatory corset.  
                                                          
5 The Fed, Bank of Japan, ECB and Bank of England have conducted QE in the form of domestic asset purchases. 
In case of the National Bank of Switzerland, these have been large-scale interventions on foreign exchange market 
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Figure 34: Annual M1 & M3 growth rate for selected countries, 2008-2018 
  
Germany      France 
 
  
Netherlands      Italy 
  
 Spain       Greece 
Source: Our elaboration on Trading Economics data. 
 
A comparison between the main European countries shows that the growth rate of M3 is al-
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the M1 has not been associated with an increase in M3, or that the latter increased but at lower 
level than expected. 
In practical terms, this implies that even if the ECB increased the liquidity in the system (as 
an increase in the value of M1 is recorded), this injection does not determine an expansion of 
M3. This indicates that the level of inflation does not rise even if the ECB supplies a large 
amount of liquidity; in fact, in normal times, the growth of the monetary aggregate M3 re-
flects an increase in the level of inflation. However, it is possible to observe a clear difference 
between the situation of some important countries like Germany and France and other coun-
tries, particularly those affected by the Sovereign Debt crisis. In fact, both Germany and 
France never recorded a negative M3 growth rate value, which inevitably affected the value of 
inflation in these countries positively. However, the situation is the opposite in economically 
stressed countries, particularly in Greece.    
Concerning the variables at the base of the money multiplier (the currency ratio and the re-
serve ratio), a significant role is played by the banking system. In particular, the debate re-
garding the banks’ regulation is controversial. On the one hand, numerous specialists are in 
favour of tighter regulation; in fact, in this way, the individuals’ confidence in the banking 
system could increase, which should decrease country’s currency ratio. Moreover, tighter reg-
ulation should increase the stability of the system and prevent an eventual possible bank cri-
sis. On the other hand, other experts maintain that tighter regulation, and so the numerous in-
struments introduced by the ECB, such as the CAR and LCR, previously explained, in some 
measure limit a possible increase in the money multiplier and, for this reason, should be better 
conformed to the bank’s needs.  
Regarding these policies, there is also debate concerning the central bank’s involvement in 
bank regulation and supervision. On the one hand, there are numerous arguments in favour of 
the central banks’ engagement in both actions. It is possible that having banking regulation 
and supervision under the same central bank’s jurisdiction would produce better mutual coor-
dination, since the actions are strongly correlated. Moreover, from a practical point of view, 
some arguments in favour of this possibility regard the similarity in the professional skills and 
data sources used at the moment of regulation and in supervision reports. On the other hand, 
the main argument in favour of a distinction between supervision and regulation relates to the 
government’s independence. In fact, this distinction could be an advantage because the mone-
tary policy is not conducted according to the political cycle and so is independent from the 
politician’s power. On the other hand, this could be a limitation; if the action conducted by the 
central bank involves even a fiscal countermeasure as a support, this becomes impossible. In 
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particular, it is possible that the government party is not disposed to accept the implementa-
tion of a fiscal policy as a support to the monetary one, which inevitably decreases the effec-
tiveness of the monetary measure.  
 
A decrease in the money multiplier is not the only possible explanation of the actual low level 
of inflation recorded inside the EA. Some other factors that cause a decline in the level of in-
flation include the decrease of money velocity and supply-side shocks. Money velocity is de-
fined as the ratio between the nominal GDP and broad money, and, in the case of the US, for 
example, it measures the number of times that one dollar is used to purchase final goods and 
services included in GDP. If the currency of a country suffers from limited credibility, then 
the demand for that specific currency will collapse because of the flight to foreign currencies 
and, as a consequence, the money velocity will decrease. Figure 35 shows the decrease in 
money velocity of the main European states. An interesting aspect is that all the states consid-
ered in the sample (which represent the main EA states) present a value of money velocity 
higher than the EA’s one. This means that some other countries, not represented in the graph, 
alter the final value of the EU’s money velocity and negatively affect the resultant level of in-
flation in the EA.   
 
Figure 35: The money velocity for selected countries, 2008-2018 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Trading Economics data. 
 
The last factor that can affect the level of inflation is supply shocks. The commodities market 
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flation is affected by the prices of imported energy, by imported food and by other commodi-
ties like metals, minerals and agricultural raw materials. In general, supply shocks, which re-
fer to the increase in the price level of these products, should determine an increase in the lev-
el of the country’s prices. The main reason why the supply-shocks do not produce an increase 
in prices is because the aggregate demand presents a very low level. However, looking at the 
trends of some commodity prices indexes (Figure 36), it is evident that these prices are actual-
ly growing; hence, in the future, the price levels will likely increase.  
 
Figure 36: Indexes of commodity prices, 2000-2018 (2005=100) 
 
Source: Dabrowski (2018). 
 
In the end, the QE policy has been more effective in some countries like Germany, France and 
Netherlands, while in the others, like Spain, Greece and Italy, it seems that it has not produced 
the expected results. A possible explanation can be found in looking at the values of the infla-
tion rate and of the money multiplier at the country level. Figure 37 illustrates the inflation 





Figure 18 presents the impact of changes in energy prices on the EA’s HICP. The choice of energy prices is 
justified by the fact that this is a largely imported item and, therefore, independent from domestic demand-side 
factors.  
Figure 17: Indexes of commodity prices, 2000-2018 (2005=100) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2018 
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Figure 37: Inflation rate and money multiplier for selected countries, 2008-2018 
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From the comparison, it is evident that those countries with a value of the money multiplier 
higher than the European ‘threshold’ also present a higher level of inflation. The European 
average money multiplier is 1.5, and, from the study, it is possible to see that countries with 
an equal or higher value are also those with a higher value of inflation. These countries are 
Germany, France and Netherlands, for which the QE policy has produced a very positive ef-
fect. 
In other countries, the situation is more complex. For peripheral countries like Greece, Spain 
and Italy, the QE policy seems not to have produced a higher effect. In reality, this is true if 
only the final value of inflation is analysed. In fact, all these countries presented a very low 
level of inflation; in mid-2017, none exceeded the value of 1.5%, and the situation was much 
more serious in Italy where the value of inflation in 2018 was equal to 1.15%. In these coun-
tries, the QE policy has not produced the expected results; the inflation level was still far from 
the target. However, from another point of view, the QE policy implemented by the ECB has 
not been completely useless; while the inflation was, and currently is, still low, the economic 
situations of these countries were not comparable to those of the core member states.  
Hence, it is important to consider that the Sovereign Debt crisis has drastically affected the 
economies of Italy, Spain and Greece. To better understand the seriousness of the crisis, it is 
useful to analyse the inflation levels of these countries in 2015 at the moment of the QE poli-
cy’s implementation inside the EA. Greece presented the worst level of inflation at (-1.73%). 
The Spanish situation was not much better at (-0.50%), and, finally, the Italian one was posi-
tive but almost null at 0.04%. These data show that the economic conditions were dramatic, 
and, even if the core countries presented very low inflation levels, they never recorded a nega-
tive value. Moreover, the situation in 2016 was exacerbated; the core countries recorded a 
supplemental increase in inflation levels, while the peripherals registered  further decreases.  
Therefore, expecting that the QE policy could completely resolve this condition was exces-
sively optimistic. However, the QE policy has produced some positive effects even in the pe-
ripheral countries. For example, in Spain, the inflation level reached the value of 1.97%. Alt-
hough the Spanish money multiplier was lower than the European average, the inflation radi-
cally increased. The analysis of the M1 and M3 growth rates can help us to understand better 
the reasons at the base. Our study shows that the growth rate of M1 radically has increased 
since 2013 and has remained at a very higher level over the years when compared with the 
pre-crisis situation. The huge increase in M1 has also been associated with an increase in M3; 
this means that Spain was able to transform the huge injection of liquidity supplied by the 
ECB into money and, as a result, its level of inflation increased. The reason at the base of this 
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success can likely be found in the implementation of the so-called TROIKA programme, 
which has reformed the banking systems of countries recently affected by the Sovereign Debt 





Our work has tried to explain the effects of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy on the 
level of prices and the reasons why the QE policy has not actually produced an increase in the 
level of inflation. As Whelan’s study (2014) finds, there is a historical difference in inflation 
values among the European member states, and this differential has been significantly exacer-
bated by the Sovereign Debt crisis of 2012. The ECB’s adoption of the QE has produced a 
positive effect on the level of prices, but a lower one than the expected. Burriel et al.’s study 
(2017) shows that this increase occurs after the UMP shocks and, in particular, distinguishes 
between the direct and indirect effects due to so-called cross-country interactions. 
This study evinces that core European countries like Germany and France benefited to a 
greater extent from the QE policy than peripheral countries like Greece and Spain. The bene-
fits that the core countries received from the QE have been an increase in the level of the out-
put, as in the case of Germany and, to a smaller degree, the Netherlands, or an increase in 
price level, as in the case of France. However, the QE policy has not produced the expected 
results in peripheral countries like Italy, Spain and Greece, where the Sovereign Debt crisis 
has drastically affected the economy. 
The possible reasons why the QE policy has not produced the expected results are numerous. 
First of all, a possible cause is the difference between the real GDP and the potential GDP of 
the countries. It is reasonable to assume that a country with a GDP level almost equal to its 
potential value will record a higher increase in the level of prices than a country with a GDP 
level lower than its potential one. Another possible cause is the soundness of the banking sec-
tor, as countries with a more fragile banking system will record a lower increase in the level 
of prices. A reason why countries like Spain and Greece recorded an unexpected increase in 
the level of prices, even if they presented a lower level of banking soundness, may lie in the 
fact that they subscribed to the so-called TROIKA programme. Participation in this pro-
gramme implies a compulsory and substantial reform of the banking sector following the 
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ECB’s indications and with the supervision of the IMF. Finally, the level of unemployment 
may also have contributed to the low effectiveness of the QE policy. In particular, those coun-
tries with a low level of unemployment will record a higher increase in the level of prices af-
ter a UMP shock. The lack of market frictions will determine an increase in the aggregate de-
mand and, subsequently, an increase in the level of prices. 
In addition to macroeconomic analysis, our work tried to analyse variations that the UMP 
shock has produced at the microeconomic level. A study conducted by Schäfer (2018) anal-
yses the effect of the European countermeasures on price stickiness and the degree of back-
wardness for some main European countries. Moreover, it shows that the UMP has produced 
a heterogeneous effect on the level of prices among the sample’s countries; this proves that a 
real and effective economic convergence is still far away among the European member states.  
Despite the implementation of a common monetary policy by the ECB, this policy does not 
translate into an equal increase in real money throughout all European countries. For this rea-
son, the last point analysed by our work is the relationship between the inflation rate and the 
money multiplier. In particular, it is evident that the money multiplier is different across the 
European member states and, hence, it is possible that the effectiveness of the QE policy has 
been influenced by this variable. An important aspect regards the M1 and M3 growth rates; if 
we compare the core and peripheral countries, we observe that Germany and France never 
record an negative M3 growth rate value, which inevitably positively affects their values of 
inflation. However, the situation is the opposite if we consider the peripheral countries, par-
ticularly Greece which has started to record a positive M3 growth rate only since 2016. Ac-
cording to our work, we can say that the QE policy has produced a larger positive effect in the 
core countries than the peripherals, but it has not been completely useless in the peripheral 
countries. A good example is the ‘Spanish miracle’ and the increase of Spanish inflation de-
spite the Sovereign Debt crisis. 
In conclusion, the money multiplier is an important factor in inflation analysis and in the 
evaluation of the monetary policy implemented by a central bank, but it is not the only one. It 
different values among the European countries reflects the large heterogeneity among them. 
For this reason, when we try to evaluate the effectiveness of the UMP and the reasons why the 
QE policy has not produced the expected results, we cannot overlook the historical and ongo-
ing differences among the countries, which inevitably dampen the policy’s effects. We cannot 
expect an equal effect among the European countries as long as homogeneity among them 
does not occur. Such homogeneity implies similar money multipliers among the states, but al-
so a lower difference between the real GDP and its potential level in each country, a level of 
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unemployment close to its frictional value in every state, and, finally, a more stable and struc-
tured banking system in every European member state. In other words, it implies Europe truly 
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